Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
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# SECRET ## 9. Enlisting Support of NATO Allies Through our Permanent Representative to the NATO Council we should immediately encourage all member countries of the Alliance to draw upon their information media resources to promote the Western position on Berlin both domestically and, where appropriate, through their overseas posts. Arrangements should be made within NATO for a continuing exchange of information on the psychological and propaganda aspects of the Berlin situation. NATO-wide on the spot coordination through NATO country diplomatic missions in certain key capitals should also be considered. (Action responsibility: State,) ## 10. Quadripartite Coordination of Information Activities An effort should be made to coordinate U.S., British, French, and German information activities relating to Berlin in order to assure the maximum use of available resources and uniformity in propaganda themes and treatment. While such coordination should be carried out principally on a government-to-government basis, coordination of the information activities of the four powers in the field should also be encouraged. There will be cases in which the information activities of one of the four governments in a given area may for historical or cultural reasons prove more effective than that of the others. In other cases, the facilities and resources of the four may differ, thus making local cooperation desirable. (Action responsibility: State, USIA.) ## 11. Provision of Background Material to SEATO, CENTO, and OAS While for various reasons it may not be practical to attempt coordinated information activities within SEATO, CENTO and OAS on the Berlin issue, steps should be taken to make suitable background material on the Berlin problem available either through our representatives to these regional organizations or through appropriate liaison arrangements. (Action responsibility: State, USIA.) ## 12. Supporting Role of RFE and Radio Liberty Arrangements should be made to provide RFE and Radio Liberty with adequate background material on the developing Berlin situation so that these stations will be in a position to lend effective support to the Allied position in their broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Action responsibility: State.) 13. Organization
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.