Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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# TOP SECRET ## INTRODUCTION 1. The military actions to implement Mr. Acheson's preliminary report on Berlin might involve, through successive stages, the full capabilities of the nation's military forces. The proposed measures ascend through force improvement, force creation, deployment, actions of harassment and reprisal and, if needed, progressive levels of armed combat. Implicit in the use of the expanded military force is a significant risk that general nuclear war may result. As US action passes through the successive stages proposed, the risks of nuclear war (1) may increase if the Soviets and GDR choose to pursue tactics denying access to Berlin, or (2) may decrease if the Soviets, being convinced by our actions that we intend to fight over Berlin, if necessary, choose to accept a face-saving political accommodation. It is a matter for political assessment whether greater risks of general nuclear war would be involved in any alternative to the proposed program of actions. 2. The distinction which the report makes between military actions aimed toward a Berlin solution and the use of nuclear weapons in any larger conflict which might grow out of the Berlin problem is recognized as an appropriate form of political guidance. But in terms of practical actions, the national readiness for that larger and nuclear conflict must be a concurrent concern, because of the uncertainties of how any conflict might begin and develop. 3. The timing and pace of military preparations are crucially important to the US ability to execute the proposals, as well as to the prospects of success. Mr. Acheson's preliminary report on Berlin contains a potentially serious conflict between its stress on a gradual, initially low-key build-up and its implicit requirement for substantially stronger non-nuclear forces in Europe. If the creation of new forces does not begin early enough, the power will not exist for carrying out the proposed response to the blocking of allied access. A period of three to four months is needed to call up, fill up, equip, train, and deploy units from the reserve components. 4. If no units are called up until October, for example, and allied access is blocked in December, only after several months of blockage would our usable strength be effectively above present levels. The range of non-nuclear choices would be substantially as narrow as now, until several months of blockage had been endured. Furthermore, the chances of competing successfully with a simultaneous Soviet build-up would be lowered by the delay. (5) The earlier
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.