Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Cooper”8 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET ## DISCUSSION It is desirable that the measures undertaken by the United States and its allies in the political, economic and military fields designed to cope with the developing crisis over Berlin must be supported by an adequate public information program. It should be the purpose of this program to present in simple but forceful fashion the basic historical facts relating to the Berlin situation - how the United States, Britain and France came to be in Berlin, what circumstances have necessitated our continued presence in the city and why it is vital to our own national security and to the security of the free world that we defend our position in Berlin at all costs. With respect to targets our information program must be designed to reach four audiences - the American public, public opinion in those countries allied with us in NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and OAS, the governments and peoples of the so-called uncommitted countries, and the people behind the Iron Curtain. With reference to the question of phasing it is clear that many courses of action to be undertaken in the information field will not be confined to one phase of the crisis but will be of a continuing nature. In other cases, the decision as to whether certain courses of action are to be undertaken and the timing of such actions will be dependent upon developments which can not be foreseen at this time. Such factors as the exchange of further communications between the West and the Soviet Union, the presentation of new proposals by either side, the possible development of a Foreign Ministers Conference or a summit meeting will clearly affect the nature and timing of propaganda actions. With these considerations in mind, the following schedule of actions is presented. ## PHASE I ## Present to September 17 During the initial phase our primary task will be to state the essential facts of the Berlin issue and to explain in terms which the various target audiences can understand the nature of the Soviet threat and its implications for them and for world peace. Stress should be placed on the human aspects of the Berlin situation without, of course, SECRET detracting
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.