Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“Headquarters”2 pages
Balance of Payments Impact of Increased Deployment. The above figures provide a rough guide for estimating the balance of payments impact of increased deployments. Deducting from $1.5 billion, $100 million of expenditures for major equipment and MAP/OSP (on the assumption that all major equipment for the additional troops would be purchased in the U.S. and the U.S. would not contemplate OSP as a means of assisting the military buildup of our allies), the net is $1.4 billion. Using $1.4 billion as the remaining balance of payments cost of the present 5 divisions, plus supporting troops and the present level of air and naval forces, one fifth that amount, i.e., about $280 million, can be apportioned per division. Accordingly, $250-$300 million per year is estimated as a rough measure of the cost to the balance of payments of stationing one additional division in Europe, together with supporting air and naval forces. There are additional factors which could affect the cost. Increased expenditure for construction, bringing present divisions up to full strength, and greatly increased requirements for tactical air strength could raise the figure above $250-$300 million. These added expenditures would be partly offset by savings on dependents, since it is assumed that dependents would not accompany the additionally deployed forces. Further savings would result from bringing home dependents currently in Europe. Stationing the newly deployed forces in temporary and inexpensive quarters might bring additional reductions in cost. As a rough guide, however, an estimate of $250-$300 million per division would appear reasonable. For the four Alternatives, the estimates of additional annual balance of payments impact would be: Alternative I-2 divisions $ 500-600 million " II-4 " 1,000-1,200 " " III-6 " 1,500-1,800 " " IV-12 " 3,000-3,600 " Recommendations on Opate of Increased Deployment. Inasmuch as the proposed military preparations are directly related to the problem of Germany and Berlin, we should look to the German Government for logistic and balance of payments assistance for additional U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The strong German reserve position of more than
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.