Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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## SECRET ## Appendix A GNP for 1961-IV is inconsistent with price stability. Of course, the low addition to defense outlays might not provoke panic buying as readily as a larger military program. But if it were viewed as a harbinger of larger future outlays, it could provoke a strong psychological reaction of consumer demand. The quantitative discussion above suggests that the major immediate threat of inflation associated with an accelerated defense program lies in the possible psychological reaction of consumers. The experience immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War provides ample evidence of such a subjectively-induced inflation. A review of the Korean period provides instructive background for the analysis of today's situation.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.