Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
## SECRET view is that the announcement should be deferred until there are visible signs of the beginning of hoarding, excessive speculation, price, and wage increases, and other inflationary manifestations. The likelihood is that the "later" date will come close on the heels of the "early" date--for public knowledge of the projected military measures may well set off an inflationary reaction--but it is at least possible that a period of weeks or months may intervene between the two dates. Whether or not the announcement of the military build-up triggers inflationary responses on the part of the public, it is assumed that the announcement of the Administra- tions economic stabilization intentions will do so whenever it occurs; it is for this reason that the President should ask for quick authority to impose a temporary price-wage freeze while the Congress is considering the enabling legislation. The advantages of acting on the "early" date are as follows: (1) Coupling the announcement of the economic stabilization program with the announcement of the military build-up would make clear to the public how the President proposed to deal with the possible economic consequences of the military measures. (2) Early announcement of the stabilization program would drive home to the public the gravity of the situation (if this is a desirable objective). (3) The earlier the announcement, the greater the likelihood that slack in the economy will absorb a substantial part of the inflationary pressure. (4) If the announcement were deferred until the later date this might necessitate reconvening Congress in a special session to act on the proposed legislation, and this might appear to be such a foreboding step as to evoke a panicky reaction from the public. In favor of the "later" date are the following considerations: (1) In the event that the crisis is short-lived and emergency stabilization measures prove to be unnecessary, "early" announcement may give rise to inflationary reactions which might have been avoided entirely; (2) Announcement at the "early" date might lead Congress to side-track the President's general legislative program; (3) Congress
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.