Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Indirect controls are not sufficient because: (a) In an economy possessing a considerable shape of liquid assets held by households and firms, it is difficult or impossible to prevent by indirect means surges of buying financed by such assets. (b) Indirect and general controls, primarily because they are indirect, can not deal with bottlenecks and spot shortages. Direct controls are thus a necessary part of an effective stabilization program. Until generalized shortages begin to appear, we do not think that further allocation or priority machinery is needed beyond what is now available under Title I of the Defense Production Act. It is to be anticipated that the burden on those regulations will increase. We do believe that Executive authority to impose direct controls over prices, wages, rents and certain forms of credit is needed as a standby defense against panic buying. But a major lesson of all previous experience in this field is that direct controls by themselves can not bear the burden of a prolonged stabilization program. Monetary and credit policy must be brought to bear against surges of purchases financed by liquid assets and credit as soon as they occur. And at a later date it may be necessary to use the tax system to absorb general excess purchasing power. 12. The foregoing analysis suggests the desirability of detailed contingency planning addressed to the following subjects: (a) The state of existing powers of the President to deal with the type of destabilization of the domestic economy that might accompany the preparation of a Berlin capability. (b) The advisability of requesting the Congress to provide the President with additional authority needed and the preparation and timing of such a request. (c) The state of Executive planning for utilization of the powers the President may now possess or acquire. The following section will include recommendations dealing with the foregoing points.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.