(U) Unidentified Flying Objects

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

CONTATION SHEET

aircraft listings on other airports were seen. Crew of Knife 27 suspected on one escaped below radar. B. On 020326L Dec, GCA radar reported NW southwest. The novice same speed as Knife 21, no evidence chopper, at 12:30. Knife 28 spatched to area, but OCK lost when Knife 20 approached within 2-3NM. JCA later lost Knife 21 when Knife 20 detached 100 feet altitude. Knife 28 approached the area without lights, tracer, or searchlight, but observed nothing. Moon reportedly has given conditions were too dark to see well. As Knife 28 returned to base pickes. Bogie again lNK southeast of where it had disappeared, lying southeast. GCA lost at after 4-5NM, still heading southeast in vicinity of VD 294. Part II. December, 606 SOS advisor to Thai Border Control Police (HRP), Region IV, reported that HPP had begun operation on 26 November between NKP and Sakhon Makhon towns in same proximity as above sighting northwest of NKP. Four to six HPP and Royal Thai Army (RTA) helicopters were involved in this operation. In addition, HPP Region IV possesses one white heuy helicopter, which is used to monitor HPP operations. Historically, Thai pilots have been reluctant to fly at night, but the moon in recent days has made night flying almost as easy as daytime operations, and Thai pilots have been known to accomplish night flights in areas where terrain is well-known to them. As in the past, chopper operations by RTA and HPP are mostly local in nature and no flight plans are filed for resupply, placement of units, or monitoring activities unless proper pressure is brought to bear. Many HPP/RTA operations against communist terrorist are autonomous in nature, and thus centralized control is weak. As result, air defense surveillance system is often not informed of flights until later—if at all. HPP advisor is attempting to secure time so flights in support of above operation, including dates, and landing areas. Part III. Historically, November and early December have produced large numbers of radar returns, particularly on GCA scopes, from natural or cultural phenomena in THAILAND. These include temperature inversions, balloons from religious celebrations, migratory birds, and kites. In November, 2017, NAP II and DO ran experiment at Udorn when GCA scopes were reporting more than 15 low/slow returns in vicinity of Udorn PTAFB. Group observes consistently scored scores of balloons, three flocks of migratory birds, several nites, plus at least four local choppers in a span of ten minutes. At same time these sightings, even of legitimate friendly flights, failed to correlate with Brigham (Udorn PTAFB-based GCI radar) and GCA returns. On numerous occasions it was established that phenomena, which U.S. personnel in GCI site would not report as authentic traffic, was reported into AOC and air defense system by Thai operators. U.S. personnel attributed these to propagation from nites. Further investigation attributed a number of sporadic returns to over-the-horizon signals distorted by weather conditions.

To date, there is no confirmed evidence that hostile aircranes have penetrated Thai air space in support of insurgent or communist activities. Though it is possible that illicit friendly flights for purposes of private gain, pleasure, smuggling are being conducted, there is no evidence to substantiate this possibility at present time. It is suspected that Lao and Thai Air Force officers can and do employ RLAP and RTAP aircraft in private ventures or travel without filing proper flight plans for informing components of the air defense surveillance system. Part IV. Nature of recent reported sightings follows same pattern as "unknown returns" reported last year by Ubon and Udorn. In analysis of possible hostile penetration of THAILAND and in support of insurgent forces, preliminary study was conducted of technical aspects of such flights. It was found that to land in remote jungle clearings at night to airlift personnel or provide resupply was highly dangerous and improbable, especially in absence of sophisticated navigation and landing aids, and was beyond technical capability of U.S. air crews. Further, study of Air Order of Battle of nearby communist or neutral countries indicates that available helicopter strength is such that hostile or unfriendly forces do not possess adequate numbers of low/slow aircraft to undertake such missions with accompanying risk factor, when they are unable to support their own field.

CONFIDENTIAL

DD 1396c

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPLACED BY PROFESSOR AUGUST

AND A FORMER AFFILIATE WHICH

MAY BE USED IN PROJECTS