Documents / FOIA release
This CIA release, approved in 2001, gathers Air Force and Research and Development Board correspondence from late 1952 about how flying saucer reports affect air defense. In it, Air Defense Command says many fast radar tracks came from mutual interference between radar sets. It warns that unexplained tracks could waste guided missiles and interceptors, so their causes must be found. Also included are a CIA memo planning a research program and an RDB memo on radar phantoms.
“The Unexplained Files”1 page
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C # Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDR81R00560R000100020001-9 CONFIDENTIAL USAF AFOOP-OP 000.92, Subject: (Unclassified) Effect of "Flying Saucers" on Air Defense Operations ADOOT-C 360.3 (27 Oct 52) 1st Ind 24 Nov 52 HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado TO: Director of Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C. 1. DCS/I, this Command, has compiled numerous reports of flying objects sighted both visually and by radar. Air Technical Intelligence at ABC has been assigned the basic responsibility for the analysis of the phenomena and a complete file is not available at ADC, nor has a complete analysis been attempted here. We are, however, vitally concerned with any phenomena which degrade the quality of operation of the ACKW system. Radar tracks which do not conform to the characteristics of current aircraft would certainly fall within this classification. 2. A preliminary investigation of "fast tracks" was undertaken by ADC in May 1952. It was concluded that a high percentage of "fast tracks" then reported was occasioned by mutual interference between radar equipments. An article was prepared for the August 1952 ADC OKE Digest to describe the phenomena of fast tracks generated by mutual interference, the methods used to identify the tracks as such, and suggested remedial measures which should be taken. The mutual interference problem will grow as the number of our radar increases and continual education will be necessary to alleviate the situation. 3. It is difficult to assess the effect of observing unusual track phenomena on the operator. As his training and experience increase he learns to recognize conventional aircraft tracks, interference, jamming and equipment malfunctioning. The introduction of unexplained phenomena will always cause some confusion. In each case, the confusion will be compounded by the necessity for submitting reports required by higher echelons. Even highly trained operators have been known to miss actual targets. Certainly the chances are much greater that a target will be missed which does not conform to the conventional pattern. 4. The flying object reports indicate many, very slow, erratic targets which could be attributed to weather phenomena, weather balloons, experimental balloons, blimps, etc. A greater number indicates speeds ranging from 700 to 2500 knots. At present we have no alternative at our radar stations but to determine if mutual interference exists and to make the required reports. In the 1955-56 period, we anticipate that interceptors and guided missiles available for air defense will be capable of intercepting targets while flying at speeds of approximately Mach 2. We also anticipate that enemy
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 11 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.