FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks- 1978 September

PP OVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR. 0-14 13NOV201
V. 5 Sep 78 N 9 ISRAEL
[Qita].] In other words, a territorial compromise?
[Bar-Lev] You can call it a territorial compromise, which is a term the Alinement uses;you can call it an agreement in principle to withdraw from territories--not from all theSterritories; you can call it negotiations on new borders--which are not the 1967 borders.Th7e terminology is less important than the essence; and the essence, in my opinion, is;we say that we are prepared to transfer territories in Judaea and Samaria to Jordaniansovereignty or Jordanian-Palestinian sovereignty in return for peace, In my estimation
this would put off a crisis for a while, but it is not possible to completely avoid acrisis and the deterioration of the situation.
[Qital] Professor Arens, what is your opinion?
[Arens] From Hayyim Bar-Levis words one could understand that the Israeli Cabinetspositions are the obstacles in the path to the possibility of reaching an arrangement with
Egypt. I am sorry to hear him say this. In my opinion this is very far from the truth.
The gap between the positions, if we want to talk about the obstacle in the path toprogress, stems from one thing which is very clear; the unwillingness on the part of
As-Sadat--at least so far--to understand the security problems with which Israel isfaced and with his unwillingness to agree with us and understand that the ability todefend ourselves requires an IDF presence in Certain places. We have not seen any signof understanding for these positions on the part of As-Sadat with respect to the inai,for which we have submitted a very generous proposal, while remaining in the Rafahapproaches and keeping the airfields, This proposal has met with total refection byAs-Saclat. Of course, we have not seen an~y readiness or responsiveness to understand ourproblems in Judaea and Samaria, which are areas which border on Israelis industrial and
population centers, As long as As-Sadat does not understand that this is Israelis manorpr oblem and also the major problem in the path toward reaching an arrangement, since anyarrangement that will not nsure Israel with the capability .to ward off enemies, whioh isreally the ability to defend itself, will not be a stable agreement. [incomplete sentenceas heardw I hope that at Camp David and perhaps in talks that will be held after it wewill observe a willingness on the part of Egypt and As-Sadat to understand our realproblems, which must be solved before an arrangement can be reached.
[Qital] Mr Bar-Lev, you maintained that Israel should change its position while Professor
Arens, in contrast, points to the need for Egypt to demonstrate more flexibility, thatis, accept an Israeli military presence in areas necessary Eor Israelis security, Itseems to me that ultimately all the parties will have to conduct a self-examination. Whatin your opinion, is the introspection which Egypt must carry out, after you touhed only
on Israelis introspection?
(Bar-Lev] I touched on Israel's self-examination because I regard it to be evading thereal Problem--and this is what Professor Arens has just done, and also what the cabinetis doing--by saying that Egypt is not ok, Egypt is not prepared [to see our point], theUnited States is not ok and is not prepared--instead of first of all saying what we areprepared to do,