FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks- 1978 September

PPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISIONAR 70-14 NOV2013
V. 29 Sep 78 N 12 IS
The Knesset authorized a certain cabinet program in which it was written that the
settlements must remain as they were. We will not be able to move from this position;
otherwise how could we say--when behind us was not only a cabinet decision, but also
a Knesset decision, our parliament--that we are implementing its decisions?
But there was a second possibility--to tell President Carter: we are saying no to
you, we will not agree to remove the settlements. And then the Camp David conference
would have blown un the same day. No agreement would have been signed. The Egyptians
would have returned to Cairo, we to Jerusalem, the Americans to Washington and I
would have been a- prime minister reporting to you. My dear and respected friends and
rivals; in my heart of hearts, in my brain, in my conscience, with all my soul I
knew if the Camp David conference were to blow up thus, the State of Israel would
not stand up before it. Not in the United States; not in Europe; not before the Jews
of the United States; not before the Jews of other countries; it would not stand up.
It would all collapse. I know how to stand up to pressure. I do not have anything
to regret. Who remembers as you do the last 9 months, between March and last month.
[as heard] In all Europe there was one paper, called L'AURORE, which from time to time
wrote a good word. And in the whole of the United States there was one provincial
paper which published a favorable article. All the world press in all the democratic
countries, without mentioning the communist and other countries, attacks; accusation;
an obstacle to peace; warmonger. And in the Israeli press as well--why should I
tell about it, after all, we all read it--all of it, without exception. -
We stood up to those 9 months, of possibly unprecedented pressure, both international
'and from within the country. I do not have to boast. When you believe in your posi-
tion, you have to know how to stand up to pressure. And after that attempt, I tell
you, ladies and gentlemen, had the Camp David conference agreed to everything and
only blown up over the matter of the settlements, Israel could not have stood--the
whole of Israel--faced with the world.
And today, sometimes there is no alternative but to declare surrender. This is my
evaluation. This is security. This is my recognition without any doubts. And so
it was a question of responsibility and I proposed to my two colleagues a third way;
We would not say yes or no. We could not say either. The Knesset must be asked.
We could not say'no. The Camp David conference would bloc-up over that. We had a
third way. We would announce that we would go to the Knesset and it would decide,
because it had decided in favor fof talks] and now it must decide which way to go.
And then, at Camp David, the idea of free voting was born. It was there, at Camp
David, that the idea of separating the voting was born. Free voting. Everyone ac- _ .
cording to his conscience. First we will vote on the two agreements. I had no doubt
that the decisive majority of the Knesset would raise its hand in favor and after-
ward, separately, we would vote on the problem -of the settlements, everyone according
to his conscience, and the Knessetts decision would be carried out. And I said to
the U.S. President: "either way" [in English] we will rely on the Knesset and you
must note down that if the Knesset decides to hold onto the settlements, they will
be held onto, whatever happens. For we accept the verdict of the Knesset. That is -
the actual story of Camp David.
There is a small addendum. On our way to President Carter, I said to my friend;
Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan: I have another idea. I will tell President Carter that .
in order .not to leave the impression that I an trying to influence the members of
Knesset,- I will not even takce part in the debate. The foreign minister said to me:
It is not befitting for .you to inform the U.S. President that you 'gill not take part
in the debate. How can a prime minister not take part in such a debate? I took -
his advice.
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