FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks- 1978 September

PPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV2013
.ep 7d ) ) ISRAEL
only did it refuse us but it also refused rt. ':ted States, even though we viewed
.his as an opening for a political settlement tha'; a;uld have answered some of our
'ishes. Egypt repeatedly rejected this despite the personal appeals of President
Carter to President as-Sadat. With my own ears I heard Carter turn to him and say again
and again: Agree to this since this will solve many things. They refused the Americans
Because of their concept.
We cannot but ask ourselves whether we are prepared to pay this price or to refuse to pay
_, a:d in that case, what will happen in the future, in 5 or 10 years? Will most of
_:e =g:eements :e will reach with the Arabs be the results of war, with a sword put to
_-e reck? Most of our agreements with the Arabs to date have been like that--in 1948,
_ 19?, after the Yom Kippur War with the disengagement of forces--with the sword laid
to their neck, our army mobilized and the, agreements being a result of war.
or the first time now an agreement is discussed without the pressure of the sword laid
t. the neck and not as a result of war. Do we really want to wait for the possibility
of future negotiations stemming from a war, a war that we will win, but a war neverthe-
less? 'ill the chances of a settlement be better then than now?
sao'ld also ask ourselves whether we are prepared to evacuate 14 settlements and
- airfields beyond the border on condition that we get a full peace and after more than
a year elapses from the beginning of the implementation of the agreement until those
_tnoiiions of full normalization--of diplomatic ties, when the withdrawal constitutes
half of the territory we should evacuate--are completed. We are either prepared for
-: _^his or we say that we.are not ready to evacuate 14 settlements and 3 airfields beyond
t^e border even if this is connected to a full peace agreement with Egypt. Then we will
^a7e to ask ourselves, what is a better goal we should seek in the foreseeable future?
*' en :e learned of the Jordanian demand for a full peace agreement--I am neither
-2"prised nor disaoprove that the various governments did not bring the Jordanian
proposals to the Knesset's decision, while now, I together with the otier cabinet
-.er.ers, recommend that this issue be decided in the Knesset. It is not that we should
_is:e. to every Arab proposal that ray be raised and say: We shall see and decide one
a7 or the other....
E 3ig3 'al Allon] In light or remarks that you have just made--why did you vote against
the interim agreement with Egypt in the Knesset in 1975?
- Dayan] I did so because that interim agreement did not give peace. We gave it in
_etur-. for nothing, do you know why, Yig'al, if I may address you as Yig'al? It is
bee=_se of the very reasons that moved you to refuse to sign that interim agreement at
the beginrir.g. You later changed your mind and decided to sign it.
.=.:ds'tinct interjections ] Well, you asked one question and it is possible the answer
does not satisfy you. Do you at least accept that that was not a proposal for a peace
set.lesent but for an interim agreement?
Iterjection apparently by MK Aharon Yadlin to the effect that there was not a total
-ithdra:al and that it was a bilateral discussion not against the background of war but
ini_ _ a state of peace ]
Ia] We are not talking now of a proposal for an interim agreement, and I can ask
=-:1_ even sharper questions such as: What has changed from the time when I said we
h_- zetter have Sharm ash-Shaykh without peace than peace without Sharm ash-Shaykh?