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FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks- 1978 September

Central Intelligence Agency · 84 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency compilation of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) material collects Israeli radio and press coverage of the Middle East peace talks from September 1978. It includes Prime Minister Begin's address to the nation before the Camp David summit and his airport statement on departure. It also contains opposition and Peace Now reactions, an interview with Moshe Arens and Hayyim Bar-Lev, parts of the Knesset debate on the Camp David accords, and remarks on Yamit settlers. The document makes no mention of UFOs.

  • p. 33 …influence from te point of vie eythat King agy p t egarding eW of relations w…
  • p. 47 …do you have signs to indicate that King Husayn is going to join the negotiations? - Begin…
  • p. 53 …It reminds the rulers of Saudi Arabia of King Faysal's vow not to abandon Jerusalem…
  • p. 69 …States - - -te- - - e easier for us? Is King Husayn of Jordan - th- h c=-Q-i…
  • p. 70 …I did not hear anybody say tha tre netotiations ae -ouldhave convinced King Husayn to accept…
  • p. 72 …Saba and Qalqilyah? This is demanded by King Husayn. Or,to the international border between Gaza…
  • p. 74 …Jordan cannot attack us because it knows thatif it does so the king from the Hashemite…
PPROV "D Fel pEASE CIA HISTORICAL C LLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13 V20:1ru
r pintof vew-when we did not have Jez-., lem--Ben-Gurion sa-
_-::ver, from a border pon oviw erepared to make peace with us on these
ths is what we have and if the Arabs are p t
_rs we will do so.
__ i7, with ?rit'e Minister Eshkol and a national unity g r t,-- d we not offet
gu3ez Canal and the Jcrdan River and we took the Golan aeights nd fr
-aking of peace with a withdrawal from Sinaith suitalet arrangements toainsureedom
shipping, and a retarn of the Golan Heigh wi thisbitand tinsure
y scuzrces o° the Jordan River? Did we not offer this? I am neither criticizirng nor
-- th atta hnw o eative answer rom Egypt and Syria we decided
in= th ia tat hntil they (?came) but established settlements in accordance
-_ - -^ ..:: i°_a "- intsthey (?name)a. and in Judaea and
; ta-richians o. Gl °ront s--on the Golan Heights and in Sinaird i eaend
har c- lan"a idy -asno way to advance toward peace or toward the achievement
- ya. tnang d -
-id that it was not the settlements that would determine
borde f we c ime a peaid at fet but that the borderline would determine
.,b~driL:° a.-chieved a Peace agreement bu httebo the bestoofdourtminimal
because we were dealing with ourselves e es there were
" _-_ .nd nationa' =cniderat.ons-not the desire to expand endlessi - w
y desGnoa ci favor or against the Allon plan; there were questions aroun
far wesho ld setle Siavc or ldgains etl a a i a e t of Al Arish or be
-- , sihld setle Sinai; should we oe -endlessly sought territory, but this pre-
- dith thae on opprio:cthe solution was that ie were discussing matters only
canen diff.rt3tconsider what the Arabs would agree to. However, we
. - - s o;,ssir g only; with ourselves.
- - in the same thing. Teds
Camp David we faced a disadvantage and an advantag o the same this The dis-
'"atgewswhtw sawa in realityr was not siilar to our dream and this was also an
r:face.; t -:a"a is aitywas we -David was no dream but reality,
dvntge as-ady nae wsas thae rwat that Cwar mo app oaching but this is a
,advag.8 - _ i h reality that we are no: - te-oror
a ret p opohlther ae tw sides and not a reality that we have creared to make
l -e°. ,n hptis not tre only country and was not the first country prep
rttal _ wth. ors.J n,_y 5cially in the past 2 years--the Jordanian Government
as epare to reach a full peace agreement with us. This lappened
d ng the Rabin go e.t d, if I am not mistaken, rin e e
There w-ere lengthy deliberations with the Joreement withthem. which laste
icr a nn tine and the Rabin government did not reach agr
f m-a side r-ark here; when we did not manage to influenee dnotrdenigrate
Goverment nte a ccipting cur concept--the Allon plan, let us say--We d che ecae
ouselves and did notcail t ~a^ overnment unsuccessful, worths tanhaduhe conducted
Jordan d d n otaoc o proPosals. I did not hear anybody say tha
tre netotiations ae -ouldhave convinced King Husayn to accept Allon's plan.
tthe truth__Lhat what we
neant is unacceptable to the Jordanian
-eet h-awhatitid-waen epared to accept. That was not a question
Wcer:said--and this~ =t orpses we are not prepare_ oacpfhnens n ueos
ofcverrr-ty _On ility or all those terms of lefthadedness and numer uhse
c° cpabi-- - s do it better. This may be done better. Howevert
ccati.cs i "l sga~rb concept prevailing in each Arab coutry and.what we
wat, a pn ..w when the United States, in the framework of those
w- ~y,.to , -;;.t we ;rans -- ."eth finde atatay out oftecnlt,
"ant, on or"er to help the two parties to fin lacey the fEytam airfield,
proposals c at a ~.nt T sraeli, air base be set up to rep
-- oposdd not agU.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 84 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.