FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks- 1978 September

P ROVED FOR RELEASE C ISTORICAL DIVISION AR 70-14 OV201
v. b ep "8N 8
~- ISRAEL
I am sure that'the"iouse is united in its gratitude to the U.S. President,: Jimmy Carter,who showed resourcefulness, a sense of timing and adherence to the goal. He spared notime or effort and stretched his prestige like a bridge over some of the wide gaps createdon the way to peace. Peace ie born in labor and its progress is made through difficultdecisions. Errors were accumulated during the conduct of the peace negotiations whichare today loaded with charges that are liable to dissolve and disintegrate things thatare vital to the State of Israel andits security. The peace agreement submitted to ustoday constitutes a double price: the price of peace itself which is inevitable; andthe price of the errors made on the way, errors which could have been avoided.
In the course of the negotiations the government began settlements in the Sinai and inthe heart of the West Bank. Settlements in this period in these places caused muchdamage to the State of Israel and the government had to stop them after the damage hadalready been done. The government first refused, later hesitated, to apply Resolution 242to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Finally, it agreed, it surely agreed, again, afterthe damage had already been done. It estimated that As-Sadat would not move toward peaceon his own. He did move and he also gained credit for that. The government hesitatedabout signing a general declaration of principles along the lines of the Vienna document,and instead signed detailed and dangerous principles that were not in the first draftdeclaration. it refused to answer the two U.S. questions. Finally it gave many answers,more far-reaching than it was initially requested to do. It did not believe thatAs-Sadat would agree to an IDF presence in the West Bank and again erred and was forced
to agree to a partial presence. We have paid a heavy price for these mistakes.
Mr Chairman, this cabinet conceded all of Sinai on one clear Jerusalem eveniward it held negotiations characterized b reg n one notJelp. Ing. After-
cabinet shattered- Israelts credibility. We stoodson ba tdefensible nborerp with settlements
and airfields.
Mr Prime Minister, it is also worth your listening, but I must tell you that I was sur-prised by your 'easoning today n the matter of the airfields. Since when do dozens ofkilometers not count today? Previously you stood on this podium and you explained, conescerning Judea and Samaria, that every kilometer and every gun matters. When you con-ceded, the territory changed, the guns have changed, *he planes have arrived--really, onash-Shaykhyto Elat. . We gave up territorial continuity from Sharm
Members of Knesset, there are those who say that this program recalls tRegarding Sinai, it is worse than the Rogers plan, because, in the Rogers plan.there
was room to conduct negotiations over the future of Sharm ash-Shaykh. We have given up
a land barrier in the Yamit Strip. This is what we told the settlers. This is whatup
we said, Mr Prime Minister, to one another-hyou called this a national consensus.this
is what we said to everyone, we said to one anther but to As-Sadat we said somethingelse. The national consensus sank in the sands or Sinai.
We have returned to the 1967 borders. We have given up a defensible border,
airfields--and, in my view, regarding airfields, we could have reached a better
agreement--and I am saying this after a talk with As-Sadath
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