Documents / FOIA release
This is a Central Intelligence Agency release of Foreign Broadcast Information Service coverage of the Middle East peace talks from December 1977. It collects British, Israeli and Soviet press and radio items on President as-Sadat's initiative and the planned Cairo conference. It also covers Prime Minister Begin's visit to London, Secretary of State Vance's regional tour and the Knesset debate on the peace plan. It contains no material on unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”11 pages
PPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV2013. V. 29 Dec 77 N 16 ISRAEL The foundations, however, in fact constitute .r nr,aLy. T: runing of' afiairE by the Arab inhabitants in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza through their chosen representatives, this is the meaning of autonomy. Therefore, the idea seized the imagination of people in the free world, in the United States, in Britain, and, I am sure, also in other countries. If somebody claims that it is not acceptable yet, well, he can claim this. We, however, gave our view--a view which constitutes a turning point--on this moral question. If we are speaking of an interim settlement. I would like to answer the members who only a month ago recommended to us not to establish a comprehensive peace or sign a peace treaty since they claimed this was impossible unless carried out through an additional interim settlement. What is an additional interim settlement--along the lines of the previous interim agreements? An additional withdrawal without peace. I am asking you, ladies and gentlemen, and myself also if this is allowed. Where could we make an interim agreement? In the Golan Heights, regarding which former Prime Minister Mr Yizhaq Rabin said: Only cosmetic changes are possible there. He meant only a few hundred meters. Could that be acceptable and serious today. Could we make an interim agreement with Jordan on the basis of Jordan's entering Jericho without peace? Could that be an interim agreement? Finally, Sinai. We withdrew there twice and would have withdrawn for the third time without peace. Until when? [MK Allon, Alinement inter- rupting] Mr Prime Minister, let me make a single correction. The Alinement spokesman, when they mentioned the possibility of interim agreements, proposed this as a second-rate option with first priority given to a comprehensive peace settlement. This should not be rejected in advance if there may be special difficulties in the future. [Begin] I have heard you. I am talking of the second option then. I am telling you, gentlemen, it does not have any connection with reality. There is simply no connection between it and real things. It is' impossible. I am coming now to the famous term territorial compromise, of which part of this house has really become enamored. Since I fell in love with my wife, I have never witnessed such love. [laughter] Levi Eshkol used to say: Everyone falls in love with his own compromise. They have fallen in love with this term; the only soluttion is territorial compromise. What is a territorial compromise? Let us analyze it with commonsense. One part to them and the other part to me, and they have to sign an agreement that the other part will be given to Israel. Signing means a peace treaty. Dear friends, one should also admit to a mistake. It appears that a territorial compromise is the obstacle to a peace treaty. Believe me, if we went to As-Sadat and said: Know this, you will have to sign and to notify the entire Arab world that you agree, with a moral signature, that the Jordan Valley will be under Israeli sovereignty, he would have said on his part: Impossible. This is the reason why we raised this [autonomy] idea, in order to make the agreement and peace possible, to leave the question of sovereignty out of our demand for and the right to sovereignty [in general]. This is how an agreement can be reached. We today do not demand that President as-Sadat give us any signature. We have our own way and he does not have to give us any signature. Therefore, we can talk and conduct negotiations about a peace treaty. Please understand that this dogmatic, routine and ossified talk about a territorial compromise foils every chance and possibility to negotiate the signing of a peace treaty.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 65 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.