FBIS Coverage of the Middle East Peace Talks: 1977 December

PPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV2013.
V. 29 Dec 77 N 16 ISRAEL
The foundations, however, in fact constitute .r nr,aLy. T: runing of' afiairE by the
Arab inhabitants in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza through their chosen representatives,
this is the meaning of autonomy. Therefore, the idea seized the imagination of people
in the free world, in the United States, in Britain, and, I am sure, also in other
countries. If somebody claims that it is not acceptable yet, well, he can claim this.
We, however, gave our view--a view which constitutes a turning point--on this moral
question. If we are speaking of an interim settlement. I would like to answer the members
who only a month ago recommended to us not to establish a comprehensive peace or sign
a peace treaty since they claimed this was impossible unless carried out through an
additional interim settlement. What is an additional interim settlement--along the
lines of the previous interim agreements? An additional withdrawal without peace. I
am asking you, ladies and gentlemen, and myself also if this is allowed. Where could
we make an interim agreement? In the Golan Heights, regarding which former Prime
Minister Mr Yizhaq Rabin said: Only cosmetic changes are possible there. He meant
only a few hundred meters. Could that be acceptable and serious today. Could we make
an interim agreement with Jordan on the basis of Jordan's entering Jericho without peace?
Could that be an interim agreement? Finally, Sinai. We withdrew there twice and would
have withdrawn for the third time without peace. Until when? [MK Allon, Alinement inter-
rupting] Mr Prime Minister, let me make a single correction. The Alinement spokesman,
when they mentioned the possibility of interim agreements, proposed this as a second-rate
option with first priority given to a comprehensive peace settlement. This should not
be rejected in advance if there may be special difficulties in the future.
[Begin] I have heard you. I am talking of the second option then. I am telling you,
gentlemen, it does not have any connection with reality. There is simply no connection
between it and real things. It is' impossible. I am coming now to the famous term
territorial compromise, of which part of this house has really become enamored. Since
I fell in love with my wife, I have never witnessed such love. [laughter] Levi Eshkol
used to say: Everyone falls in love with his own compromise. They have fallen in love
with this term; the only soluttion is territorial compromise. What is a territorial
compromise? Let us analyze it with commonsense. One part to them and the other part
to me, and they have to sign an agreement that the other part will be given to Israel.
Signing means a peace treaty.
Dear friends, one should also admit to a mistake. It appears that a territorial compromise
is the obstacle to a peace treaty. Believe me, if we went to As-Sadat and said: Know
this, you will have to sign and to notify the entire Arab world that you agree, with a
moral signature, that the Jordan Valley will be under Israeli sovereignty, he would
have said on his part: Impossible. This is the reason why we raised this [autonomy]
idea, in order to make the agreement and peace possible, to leave the question of
sovereignty out of our demand for and the right to sovereignty [in general]. This is
how an agreement can be reached. We today do not demand that President as-Sadat give
us any signature. We have our own way and he does not have to give us any signature.
Therefore, we can talk and conduct negotiations about a peace treaty. Please understand
that this dogmatic, routine and ossified talk about a territorial compromise foils every
chance and possibility to negotiate the signing of a peace treaty.