Documents / FOIA release
This is a Central Intelligence Agency release of Foreign Broadcast Information Service coverage of the Middle East peace talks from December 1977. It collects British, Israeli and Soviet press and radio items on President as-Sadat's initiative and the planned Cairo conference. It also covers Prime Minister Begin's visit to London, Secretary of State Vance's regional tour and the Knesset debate on the peace plan. It contains no material on unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”42 pages
PPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV201 v. i13cl iN 12 ISR'AEL . i am :-e nig on my good '-i.unds f"om (ush eunim to do the work wth . _n :da; I"t; ,;ha n i. was Lneai i thi o s ; o th e r n i gh i; I am -..n need of fri ends and, alSo o1 opponents. Cpponents catai yeS thc thi.rPaing. Hivove, iuprvisor.; over Eretz Yisra'eli propriety are not required. -ie have devoled all cur lives to }:.rets isra'el and to the struggle for its liberaticn. ;;.. wl o add: Lct them let us argue on this matter with respect and ithout such renarics as were earid last week. !rs iMKGe'utla Cohen said that As-Sadat shocked us wice: once ini the Yom Kippur war and then when he c"e.'. to Jerusclem. I greatly regretter ths comparion. 7 t is lightheaded to a certain degree and is unfounded. There are shocks and shocks. Tarks., airplanes, surprise, no mobili.zaticn in Israel, no proper preparations---that was a shock with tragic results. The Egyptian president coenc to us, we receive him with honor, he wants to address the Knosset and we enable imre to adcir'ss .th? people and the world from the podium of the Knesset, He wants to meat ith The actions , with all of us, including the oppos i.tion parties. He is el'.?cm to do o. Is this the same kind of saock? He came in accordance with his ;ta- rning anLd his conditions, with tidings of peace, and a coemparisn bemtween thii.s ., and.: tat one--I had no shock. Why? 1 want thu whole Knesset to know that, -asi,.ly nea:ng, all this happened at our initiative. The only surpri^e given us .--.. _.,_i... a -adat wass in his arrival in Jerusaln, but the meeting with me or with - .c:l:.:ags was nota surorise. Since we took control of things according to the um-crst:.c decision of the Israeli people, we have not hesitated directly or indirectly, iron the Knesset podi umr and in the conventional. nonpublic way, to propose a ieeting between;. President as-Sadat and myself. When I tisited. the United States in July and was received by the U.S. President, I raised the possibility of a meeting with President as-Sadat. When Secretary of State Vance visited the Miiddle East and returned to us .t'rom Egypt, I asked him: What do - you think about the possibility of a meeting with As-Sadat? I would like to meet with him. Vance's reply was: He would also like to meet with you. When I visited Romania in August and had talks with President Ceausescu, I raised the possibility and mentioned the wish to meet with the Egyptian president. The Romarian president, who had played an important and vital role in the recent developments -- and for this we should thank him from the podium of our parliament--told me: In the near future, he would like to have a meeting between your representatives and his. Yet, a personal meeting also would be possible. President as-Sadat went to Romaria, and I' know from the most reliable source that President Ceausescu reported to him about his talks with me. He recomnended to the Egyptian president that such a meeting be held. It seems that President as-Sadat reached the conclusiot that this was desirable and proper. The evidence for this he himself furnished a few weeks ago on his flight from Bucharest to Teheran, after his talks in Romania; the idea of visiting Jerusalem occurred to him. This was no surprise to us. It i true, when President as -Sadat first ma.de his announcement in the Egyptian parliament that he was prepared to come to Jerusalem and address the Knesst--it is -rue, we requested and invited him to come. In our first announcement we clearly stated: Your two demands, for Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 19c7 and the establishment of a Palestinian state, are unacceptable to us. However, if you want to come to Jerusalem you can raise these ideas .of yours, since this is the meaning of not presenting preconditions. You can bring your ideas, but do not condition the neeting on the acceptance of these ideas by the other party. Later, on public occa- sions and appearances, I had the opportunity daily of reinforcing this invitation.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 65 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.