1995-10-01a- CIA Conference Report: THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE 1990S GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 01-Oct-95

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ratio of 10 UN forces to I rebel force is needed to con- going to have to run that economy well to be able to
tain the anarchy; with the UN's current resources, that make it work. I think that there is going to be a tre-
is not feasible. Furthermore, countries that participate mendous effort by the leadership to hold things
in the UN peacekeeping operations, as in Somalia, and together. There are so many incentives in terms of the
that experience casualties, will develop a great reluc- potential for South Africa that I think the possibility
tance to participate in support of this kind of policing that people will actually get together and make things
action. work is every bit as high as the possibility that we will
have a conflagration.
Perhaps there ought to be standing regional forces in
Africa, South America, and Central America for DR. DE BLIJ: I think that Professor Honey might be
emergencies of this kind so that imperialist powers do right except for the effect of sanctions. Those of us
not get involved in the kind of peacemaking that get who supported the sanctions helped create in South
soldiers killed. I am encouraged that ECOMOG, the Africa an ungovernable minority of hundreds of thou-
West African force, has achieved as much as it has. I sands of young, uneducated Africans who said "liber-
still believe that, with the UN's limitations, having ation before education." These youths will now be
standing regional forces is the way for regional prob- Nelson Mandela's major problem and are the major
lems to be solved. I am a great believer in UN inter- source of violence in the townships. Those people are
vention, but I am not sure that the United Nations has not retrievable. Unemployment in South Africa is 48
the resources to intervene at the level it should have. percent, not because there are not people to employ
but because they have no skills to employ them with.
DR. HONEY: I think what really needs to be done is These people are going to have a revolution of rising
to formulate a UN policy that provides a generic, expectations, and, believe me, a revolution South
rather than ad hoc, structure for intervening. I think Africa will get.
the difficulty we have now is that we are building a
house without a blueprint. Obviously, the world is not Another problem will be the integration of the armed
going to stop, but, if we really are going to have suc- forces.
cessful interventions, we need to figure out institution-
ally how they will work. Then I think we will have a QUESTION: Regarding your point that US forces.
chance of some successes. should not be in Somalia, is that a reflection of what's
happening now or would you never have sent them
QUESTION: You had mentioned the need for interna- there in the first place?
tional intervention in South Africa-potential UN
intervention. I know that, currently, we're talking DR. DE BLIJ: I never would have sent them in the
about election monitors. Is that sufficient to tide South first place. I thought our job was to feed people. It
Africa over until the election and afterwards? could have been done from the air. It could have been
done with the help of the agencies already there. I
DR. DE BLIJ: In the case of South Africa, I think a think our tactics in Somalia were wrong. Frankly, it is
massive intervention that might keep the peace there, going exactly the way I though it would go. It is a
should it be needed, would pay for itself for a century quagmire, and it may, in fact, lead to a fragmented
to come, whereas that might not be the case in, say Somalia in the end, that is not what we had in mind. If
Somalia or Rwanda. feeding the population is the objective, it ought to be
done from a distance. What is now happening-the
DR. HONEY: I am more optimistic about South policing action that you can see coming-builds
Africa's future than Professor de Blij. We do not have resentment to the presence of a large foreign force and
a crystal ball, but I have a hunch that pragmatism is is not acceptable.
going to prevail. Clearly the ANC leadership, despite
its at least titular Marxist past, understands that it is
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