1995-10-01a- CIA Conference Report: THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE 1990S GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 01-Oct-95

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Reaction by Members of Nontitular Groups to Table 3 Percent
Rising Territorial Nationalism Population Born in the Republic of
Current Residence, 1989
Acceptance and Accommodation
A certain segment of the nontitular population that
was ethnically marginal was undergoing process of Republic Titular Russians Non-
acculturation and assimilation either with the titular Russians
nation or with the local Russian population. For the Ukraine 96.4 56.7 67.5
most part, these were nontitular people who had lived Belarus 97.6 42.2 66.9
outside their homelands for several generations and Moldova 98.1 52.0 72.1
whose ancestors had moved from their homeland Uzbekistan 98.2 55.0 82.4
before nationalization processes had begun (Kaiser Kazakhstan 95.1 66.6 63.5
1994). Of this acculturating/assimilating segment of Kyrgyzstan 98.5 59.1 76.4
the nontitular population, those who are becoming Tajikistan 98.5 48.5 87.3
acculturated to the indigenous nation will accept, and Turkmenistan 98.9 52.0 79.9
even promote, the new ethnic reality if they are Georgia 98.8 48.3 89.1
accepted by the titular nation. On the other hand, those Azerbaijan 96.7 65.5 87.9
undergoing a process of Russification may respond as Armenia 78.4 26.4 82.9
the local Russian population does. Conversely, the Lithuania 97.8 49.7 66.0
process of Russification itself may be reversed. For Latvia 96.9 54.7 35.9
example, children with Russian and Ukrainian parents Estonia 95.6 42.9 23.6
who claimed to be Russians in the past may prefer to In successor states that have experienced violent conflict:
identify themselves as Ukrainians, particularly in Ossetians Abkhazlans
states where titular nationalism is directed against the Georgia 97.1 98.3
local Russians (for instance, in Latvia and Estonia). Armenians
Azerbaijan 94.0
Beyond this ethnically marginal population, there is Azeris
also a segment of the nontitular population that has Armenia 91.2
lived in the same republic and locality for generations Gagauz Ukrainians
and has developed a strong sense of homeland (see Moldova 96.0 67.0
table 3). Several indicators of acceptance have Uzbeks
become apparent, particularly for the Russians living Kyrgyzstan 93.8
in the non-Russian successor states. For example, a Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi PerepisiNaseleniia
relatively high percentage of Russians favored the 1989 Goda, Volume 12, (Minneapolis: East View Publications,
independence of the republics they lived in and voted 1993).
for independence-oriented parties, and a relatively
high percentage of Russians also identified Estonia as However, acceptance and accommodation are also
their homeland (Drobizheva 1991). Surveys of Rus- dependent on the behavior of the titular nationalists. In
sian interethnic attitudes tended to show a willingness the case of Estonia, nationalists seeking to reduce the
to remain in the newly independent states, at least Russian presence have alienated Russians who had
immediately after independence. It may appear behaved as Estonian patriots. A similar situation
counter-intuitive, but the Russian reaction to the new occurred in Latvia. Under these conditions, Russians
ethno-political realities in the successor states appears are unlikely to remain accommodative of titular
more accommodative than resistant thus far; this may nationalism. Russian opposition is on the rise in the
reflect the limited degree of Russian national con- Baltic states, as well as in Kazakstan-two regions
sciousness and nationalism. The republics where Rus- where Russian acceptance and accommodations were
sians comprised the highest proportion of nontitular dominant through 1992.
population are those without violent ethnic conflict.
66