Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, dated October 1995, contains the proceedings of a conference on ethnic conflict held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored it. Academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials presented papers on ethnic and territorial conflict in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. They also discussed what these conflicts mean for US policy. The document contains no UFO material.
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C00123268 Table 2 Percent Ethnodemographic Trends, 1959-89 Titular Nation in the Homeland Titular Nation in the Total Population Percentage Percentage Republic 1959 1989 Point Change 1959 1989 Point Change Russia 85.8 82.6 -3.2 83.3 81.5 -1.8 Ukraine 86.3 84.7 -1.6 76.8 72.7 -4.1 Belarus 82.5 78.8 -3.7 81.1 77.9 -3.2 Moldova 85.2 83.4 -1.8 65.4 64.5 -0.9 Uzbekistan 83.8 84.7 0.9 62.1 71.4 9.3 Kazakhstan 77.2 80.3 3.1 30.0 39.7 9.7 Kyrgyzstan 86.4 88.2 1.8 40.5 52.4 11.9 Tajikistan 75.2 75.3 0.1 53.1 62.3 9.2 Turkmenistan 92.2 93.0 0.8 60.9 72.0 11.1 Georgia 96.6 95.1 -1.5 64.3 70.1 5.8 Azerbaijan 84.8 85.7 0.9 67.5 82.7 15.2 Armenia 55.7 66.7 11.0 88.0 93.3 5.3 Lithuania 92.5 95.3 2.8 79.3 79.6 0.3 Latvia 92.7 95.1 2.4 62.0 52.0 -10.0 Estonia 90.3 93.8 3.5 74.6 61.5 -13.1 Source: Robert Kaiser, The Geography ofNationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, in press), tables 4.1 and 4.3. In Georgia a slightly different interethnic dynamic evidence that socioeconomic development or modern- regarding social mobility and relative deprivation ization, and even the provision of indigenous privi- developed. The Georgians in Abkhazia, who view this leges, did not solve the national problem. territory as part of their homeland, were angered by the preferential treatment accorded Abkhazians as part Nearly all non-Russians have used the rhetoric of of the indigenization program. Abkhazians were only internal colonialism. The least developed, such as the 17 percent of the population but, as the titular group in Tajiks, charge that the USSR did not live up to its Abkhazia, had a much higher percent of slots in promise of interethnic and interregional equalization. higher education, high status jobs, and political repre- The most developed; such as the Estonians, charge sentation reserved for them. In Nagorno-Karabakh the that they would be even more developed if they had demographic shift toward Azeris was coupled with their independence. This feeling of relative depriva- Azeri challenges to Armenian privileges in the region. tion was a potent catalyst for rising territorial national- In both cases the Georgian and Azeri attempts to ism that ironically was perhaps most influential in the remove or reduce Abkhazian and Armenian privileges most developed republics because the message of resulted in civil warfare, as Abkhazians and Arme- external exploitation and domination interacted with nians in Nagoma-Karabakh sought to secede. the trend toward demographic dilution among nations with a highly developed national consciousness and a It is also true, however, that the most socially mobi- sense of homeland. lized titular nations, that is, the Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, and Armenians-are also among the most nationalistic. The Soviet case provides convincing 65
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.