1995-10-01a- CIA Conference Report: THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE 1990S GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 01-Oct-95

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still a dangerous place and that only one institution Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however,
has the operational capabilities and habits of coopera- address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot
tion to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife,
the post-Cold War era: NATO. and political instability in the East. Their fates are
intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at
To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of
transform itself from an Alliance based on collective recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most
defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create eco-
committed to projecting democracy, stability, and nomic refugees throughout Europe.
crisis management throughout the Continent. This
cannot be done without engaging the nations to the While Europeans must ultimately determine their own
East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie economic architecture, Americans have a large stake
in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations, in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the
it will become increasingly irrelevant-a closed, world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the ame-
chummy club without a mission or a message. Any nable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC nego-
new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive tiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to
rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivi- decrease trade barriers and to increase market access
sion of Europe into blocs. to our respective markets.
Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new European economic integration is of particular interest
members, largely to the East but also to include the to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the
approach-which has been called the "Partnership for leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to
Peace" program-would provide a framework within the false stability and the failed statist policies of the
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for past. Just as in the security field, American policy-
enhanced political and military cooperation. Under makers should seek to extend the zone of economic
this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan, prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expan-
train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this sion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the
partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO greater integration of the former East Bloc into the
membership. In short, future expansion should be evo- global trading system. We should lower or eliminate
lutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stabil- inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best
ity of Europe. guarantee for a prosperous Europe.
Trade, Not Aid CSCE: Conscience of Europe
While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West Euro- The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of
pean officials smugly maintained that they had Europe. European statesmen from Vacel Havel to
resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited
united and prosperous European Community, they the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document
believed, could be protected from the economic and of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the
political instability in the East. The euphoria was short demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always
lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leader-
Treaty was drafted "too soon and too quickly." Faced ship believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet
with depressed economies and weak governments, presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
European polities, like their American brethren, seek
national solutions to global problems. Western Europe
threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly.
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