1995-10-01a- CIA Conference Report: THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE 1990S GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 01-Oct-95

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Now that the global map is most defined by the the situation. Analysis and policy decisions regarding
nation-state, the peoples within must define them- ethnic conflict in China should consider several issues,
selves vis-a-vis the nation-state. E. K. Francis, in his which follow.
InterethnicRelations (1978); argued that the rise of
ethnic identities and interethnic conflict was a phe- Cultural nationalism and ethnic difference should be
nomenon tied most directly to the nation-state. It is the taken seriously. This is true not only among the "offi-
nation-state that takes upon itself the task of legislat- cial" minority nationalities, who are stigmatized or
ing identity. Empires were consumed more with rul- empowered because of that designation, but also .
ing, rather than legislating and identifying the peoples among at least two other kinds of groups: applicant
under their spheres of influence. In the modern era, it groups and sub-Han groups.
is often the nation-state apparatus itself with which
ethnic groups find themselves in opposition. By agree- Applicant groups are seeking or have sought to be rec-
ing to articulate their identities along the contours ognized as "official" minority nationalities. Many of
shaped by ethnic identification policies and censuses, these groups were not recognized in the 1940s and
ethnic groups demonstrate their desire to form coali- 1950s during the nationality identification programs,
tions at the highest possible level in order to interact and some have sought, indeed militated for and politi-
as a powerful collectivity with the state apparatus. cally organized around, nationality recognition. There
are at least 15 groups who have applied and are under
These ethnic identities are "imagined" in Ben Ander- consideration for nationality recognition by the State
son's (1983) terms, but they are never arbitrary. They Commission for Nationalities (guojia minzu shiwu
form according to cultural, historical, and political weiyuanhui). These groups include the Chinese Jews
power oppositions and alliances. What we are wit- (you tai ren), Khmer, Sherpas, Ku Cong, Deng (a
nessing today with the end of the Cold War is the Tibetan sub-group), Chuanqing, and several others
moving down of oppositional alliances to levels that (see Heberer 1990). Some 900,000 people in Guizhou
now emphasize the importance of the politics of dif- Province alone applied for minority recognition in the
ference below the level of the Han. The opposition to early 1980s, and the 1982 census reported that
the West, to imperialism, and to the Japanese is no 799,705 "unidentified" people remained in China. Of
longer a motivating force binding China together. interest are the Chinese Jews, once thought to be
extinct but now claiming a membership of 8,000 and
under consideration for rapid recognition due to
Ethnic Nationalism in China: Some Policy China's official diplomatic ties to and improving rela-
Considerations tions with Israel. Although this group is certainly not
militant, it stands to benefit considerably from recog-
The increasing importance of playing the politics of nition, perhaps leading to local-level rivalries with
difference for personal and corporate gain out of other groups, particularly with Hui Muslims, to whom
response to stigmatized identities, or just out of a many of the Chinese Jews formerly belonged. Another
renewed sense of the meaningfulness of one's history group, the Ku Cong, presently classified as a branch of
in China, has important implipations for how we the Lahu nationality in Yunnan and known as the Yel-
understand ethnic identity and the potential for con- low Lahu, are worth noting because one of their mem-
flict. Although this paper does not predict ethnic con- bers, Wang Zhengcun, was the elected leader of the
flict along any predetermined lines, the argument here Tiananmen Square Nationalities Institute's student
is to suggest the importance of certain faultlines, democratic group and was sought and arrested as
should fragmentation, most iiportant at the center of number 3 on the most wanted list. He has long been
the state's power structure, occur. The Uighur will known as a "Ku Cong" nationalist, seeking recogni-
never become independent as long as Beijing is in tion of his people, illustrating the importance of this
firm control, but Beijing is increasingly dependent on issue for political activism (see Gladney 1990).
Canton, and, if Canton should make a move, many
Uighur would be only too glad to take advantage of
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