Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Cooper”12 pages
REL Ger iE- sLUL1:1 , k,,,„ U ..." " EC ',.' ' A T/RELEASE -rri nEnSurvey Report of ZIPPER I s Satellite OneratilUMFAIIMIY0 I_ GENERAL DISCUSSION 1.) It must be understood that one cannot get a complete impression through purely statistical evaluation. It is felt that in order to strike a balance, the increased difficulties for intelligence work in all Satellite States during 1952 should be taken into consideration. 50/S is therefore of the opinion that these difficulties should be pointed out again, in detail,as follows: ( 1) Intelligence against POLAND was made difficult chiefly through 3 measures taken by the Poles: stricter border-controls; changes in documentation; political developments within Poland. (1) Increased border controls: The frontier between the Sovzone and Poland was definitely closed in the Neisse area through barbed-wire entanglements and watch- towers. To cross the border in that area ia extremely risky and can only he undertaken by a very courageous and daring individual. The Oder-frontier is not closed in all places by barbed-wire en- tanglements, but does have watch-towers and regular patrols. The natural obstacle of the Oder River and the marshy region around the lower river require a well-functioning ferrying point, if possible, by Oder-fishermen for any crossing. The fact that fish- ing at night-time was prohibited is also a great handicap for in- telligence activities. The frontier section west of Stettin is made secure by strong barbed-wire entanglements. The coast of the Baltic is guarded by patrols, chiefly on horseback. Watch- towers and beacon lights make any sea-landing well-nigh impossible. Regulations with regard to residence or travel in the frontier . areas and in the coastal districts are stricter than ever. Crossing the 20 km wide border zone is only possible at night-time. The frontier guards on the Sovzone side were not noticeably increased. On the Neisse-side Soviet jet patrols were also ascertained. (2) Documentation: The changes in documentation in early summer 1952 made all agent activities in Poland impossible for about 3 months as our previous documents were no longer valid due to the naw stamps on the Polish registration cards in May. New documents could not be.made out before sufficient materiel was available. In the meantime a new identity card is being issued with the result that it is once more impossible to send agents out before this new document has been .procured._ (3) Inutr-Political davalonTentg: Through new elections, the acceptance of a new constitution and the formation of a government modelled after the Soviet pattern the Satellite structure of Poland has become even stronger. The Soviet influence is growing.. An attitude of resignation is easily under- ' f • f-, SECRET/RELEASE L..? Attaclunent -A TO GERMANY ONLY REL Ger Secret 656
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.