Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 218 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.

  • p. 5 …is to a /AMIM *tat due te'the • desire to, afore ;bade& s cooperation, end, Sismi…
  • p. 46 …lereioe end, ile..hops,,,s friendly end cooperating cmes , Pot our present luer,ore.tica 1itsbnlasts…
  • p. 56 …All preparations and plans for such an • eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the DS…
  • p. 64 …between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al- most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the…
  • p. 73 …countries overseas; others are recruited for IS- cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or…
  • p. 112 …Gehlen who closely cooperates With the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches…
  • p. 116 …close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past…
  • p. 128 Secret REL Ger intelligence -- 4 • Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up…
  • p. 135 …Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin the untsovering of…
  • p. 170 …Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy…
  • p. 187 …is far outweighed • by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection…
  • p. 188 …To what extent this will event—: - ually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus…
Secret
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US CATICiP.L.; Ci1LY
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TO GERMANY ONLY
POB Comment: ZIPPER should handle its own internal security, includ-
ing security clearances.
b. The civil security controls mentioned in par. 3., ref. (1), are clear-
ly not within the ZIPPER province but a matter for the BfV, as the west German
security agency working in conjunction with the LfVs and law enforcement
agencies, such as police, customs and border guards.
c. ZIPPER's view has been that counter-ea iona e, both outside and within
western Germany, should be the exclusive domain among German services) of
ZIPPER. According to the ZIPPER version (oral) of the ZIPPER-BfV protocol,
which has been laying on Minister LEHR's desk for 8 months, it was agreed be-
twenn ZIPPER and the BfV that all CE cases coming to the attention of the BfV
would be passed to ZIPPER, i.e. the BfV acceded to ZIPPER's view. Though both
JOHN and UTILITY have nade official statements to the effect that the arrange-
ment between ZIPPER and the BfV is satisfactory, ZIPPER states, off the record,
that the situation between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al-
most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the Bill with CE and counter-subversive infor-
mation and gets almost nothing in return. The Bill has nqt observed its agree-
ment to turn over CE cases to ZIPPER; instead, BfV has been running CE cases and
not passing the CE information to ZIPPER.
NOTE: GLOBKE, discussing the VS-ZIPPER relationship with and.
IIIIIIrin Bonn, did not appear to be quite in agreement with ZIPPER's
proposition that ZIPPER should have exclusive responsibility for the
conduct of CE cases within western Germany. GLOBKE also described
the East-West Germany situation as sufficiently unusual to warrant
a deviation from any classical concept of clear-cut delineation of
"CI-CE" functions. He specifically stated that he foresaw the GIS
playing the primary CE role; however, the BfV would not be excluded
from the field.
POB Comment: A single and centralized agency should have exclusive
responsibility for counter-expionage; this should be the GIS. However
both the MV and ZIPPER are in the CE field now, as competitors, and
both can be expected to remain so for some time. There is also a
good possibility that the various LfVs will occasionally try to play
the game independently .too.
d. The counter-subversive field is the most confused of all. Ideally,
this would be the exclusive domain of the Bill, which would pass all CE leads to
ZIPPER, as well as the background type information necessary for the planning of
CE operations. This has not happened; the MV has not provided ZIPPER with
required information; consequently, ZIPPER has engaged in CS work, is continuing
to do so and expects to have to keep on doing so for quite a while. The ZIPPER
Cl/CE budget for the FY 1952-'53 is based on the assumption that the relationship
with the BfV will continue bad; that ZIPPER must continue to play a role in the
CS field in western Germany, because the MV will not meet its requirements;
that ZIPPER's investigative and surveillance facilities must be expanded because
reasonable service la not forthcoming from the MV.
• SECRET/RELEASE
19 GERMANY ONLY
US E
651
REL Get
Secret

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.