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/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 218 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.

  • p. 5 …is to a /AMIM *tat due te'the • desire to, afore ;bade& s cooperation, end, Sismi…
  • p. 46 …lereioe end, ile..hops,,,s friendly end cooperating cmes , Pot our present luer,ore.tica 1itsbnlasts…
  • p. 56 …All preparations and plans for such an • eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the DS…
  • p. 64 …between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al- most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the…
  • p. 73 …countries overseas; others are recruited for IS- cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or…
  • p. 112 …Gehlen who closely cooperates With the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches…
  • p. 116 …close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past…
  • p. 128 Secret REL Ger intelligence -- 4 • Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up…
  • p. 135 …Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin the untsovering of…
  • p. 170 …Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy…
  • p. 187 …is far outweighed • by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection…
  • p. 188 …To what extent this will event—: - ually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus…
I
Secret
REL Ger
„N:CHL; CafilkiL-
us om9ALs ONLY SECRET/RELEASE
T GERMANY ONL)also security investigations as conducted by the "Ial kapelle".
(2) "Gegenspionage" (formerly III4)1 pure CE.
(3) "Ermittlungsdienst" (formerly III-C--"civil security"): counter-
subversion (CS), i.e. counter-action aimed at groups and persons not necessarily
engaging in espionage (i.e.'not pure CE), such as the Communist Party and extrem
rightist organizations which might subvert the form of government by unconstitu-
tional means.
c. POB agrees with par. 3, ref. (1), in using CI as the overall term. In-
cluded within CI are defensive and aggressive divisions. Within the defensive
division, security, are these subdiviaions: internal security and civil securi'
Within the "aggressive CI" division (for which we have no shorter specific title
we include CE (as defined in the last sub-paragraph of par. 3, ref. (1)). How-
ever we believe that the preceding paragraph of reference includes an additional
element of aggressive CI, i.e. counter-subversion (CS), not mentioned therein.
The third line of that paragraphahould read "or persons engaged in clandestine
intelligence or other activities detrimental to the. . ." CE is the action de-
tigned to negate clandestine intelligence, i.e. espionage, while CS elms at
countering non-espionage ("other") activities. Thus, we use CS as a term to ap.
ply, for example, to observation and penetration of the Communist party, which
does not necessarily have anything to do with CE, though it does fall within the
field of "agressive CI". In addition, we consider counter-sabotage another sub-
division of "aggressive CI".
VOTE: The division between CE and the other components of CI has more
than theoretical value; it serves the utilitarian purpose of drawing
a clear line between Dyclean's exclusive charter in the external CE
field and those of other agencies in the CI field, ouch as Dymacaco and Dymacule.
Such a clear distinction is useful to all concerned and is the realis-
tic means of avoiding inter-agency squabbling. Admittedly, there are
lapses and overlaps, but, although these are winked at, the charters
are clear. There is, unfortunately, no such clear delineation between
ZIPPER and the BfV.
3. The CI Roles of ZIPPER and the BfV. It would be easy to theorize, on the
normative level, that ZIPPER should confine itself to CE and that the BfV
should confine itself to the remainder of the CI field in western Germany. The
actualities are more complicated.
a. The Internal security of ZIPPER is exclusively ZIPPER's concern at the
present; likewise, ZIPPER's role in internal security is confined to ZIPPER.
VOTE: UTILITY, over the past 3 years, has maintained the position
that he considers the BfV the agency to handle internal security mat-
ters, to include even background investigations for security clearance
of prospective GIS employees. However, we doubt that he would agree,
at present, to having the BfV, headed by Otto JOHN (considered a BIS
agent by ZIPPER), conduct investigations of present or prospective
ZIPPER employees.
CRIA ,.1SECRET/RELEASE
iFCL.4DIALY TO GERMANY ONLY
REL Ger
Secret 650

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.