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/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 218 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.

  • p. 5 …is to a /AMIM *tat due te'the • desire to, afore ;bade& s cooperation, end, Sismi…
  • p. 46 …lereioe end, ile..hops,,,s friendly end cooperating cmes , Pot our present luer,ore.tica 1itsbnlasts…
  • p. 56 …All preparations and plans for such an • eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the DS…
  • p. 64 …between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al- most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the…
  • p. 73 …countries overseas; others are recruited for IS- cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or…
  • p. 112 …Gehlen who closely cooperates With the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches…
  • p. 116 …close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past…
  • p. 128 Secret REL Ger intelligence -- 4 • Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up…
  • p. 135 …Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin the untsovering of…
  • p. 170 …Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy…
  • p. 187 …is far outweighed • by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection…
  • p. 188 …To what extent this will event—: - ually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus…
EMET1KELEAS1
TO GERMANY OKIL
REL Ger
Secret
Secret
REL Ger
%MI-27784, if we interpret the presence of ZIPPER operators
in an American station under these circumstances to be "in
American interest". If we take the position of either "a" or
"b" above, it will be contested by ZIPPER. Solution "c" is
obviously the ZIPPER solution. If we reject it we should deter-
mine beforehand on what basis we wish to reject it. Is At be-
cause we do not agree with the basic ZIpPERooncept Of retaining
their organizational integrity under these circumstances? . Ig
it because of the difficulties we envisage they will encounter
in attempting to develop a 10-position base station in OSMOSIS?
Is it because of our own security considerations at US controlled
and operated base stations? Solution "d" could be stated in
several variations - for example, in terms of an inadequate
OSMOSIS station and-the alternate solutions of "a" "b" or "c".
However, it is felt that the various aspects of this problem
have been adequately presented.
7. I feel that we should determine the limits of the posi-
tion that we are willing to discuss . with ZIPPER and then 14tiate
herein Pullach discussion designed to clarify and resolve, once
and for all, the misunderstanding and outright differences that
cloud all of our present planning in this field.
• 8. A year frOm now we expect to have trained and prepared
to operate approximately 60 MIT agents. At present we have
21 trained M/T F-Net operators; 27 in .training. This does not
include MIT agents in the Sovzone . or Satellite areas who are being
integrated gradually into our SATURN plans. See MGLA-6124, 6434,
and 6701. Although we know that a number of them would not sur-
---„; we feel that we must plan on a-base-station with approxi-
mately 10 operating positions,
9. In general, the entire SATURN program is progressing
satisfactorily. The burial program is underway. e believe the
technical problems have been solved. 11111111 and are
.aurrently. in Berlin observing burials fia7Tbit area. We are
• planning several CPX problems during the summer to check our
E-Plan communications. is handling this entire
matter .most effectively.
10. A . mitter of real-concern to us is the fact that we have
1
been almost completely unsuccessful in obtaining Army agreement
to plan for logistical or administrative support of our evacua-
'tion and subsequent Operational plans for ZIPPER. We have lowest
priority for road space in the evacuation. We are being promised
no trucks. A check with Lt. Col. Leffers, formerly with us and
now with the EUCOM Detachment in France and responsible for setting
up supplies for a possible evacuation to France of EUCOM units
(including the Munich Post personnel), reveals the fact that no
consideration is being given to supporting any non-U.S. personnel,
and specifically ZIPPER, in France. Equally serious t all reserve
SECRET•SECRET/RELEASc
'MANY ONLY
646

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.