Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Headquarters”17 pages
Secret REL Ger -3- EE11RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY necessary. Considerable progress has been madereever, we sufficiently to permit the emergency use of an base, if are not optimistic that this progress in getting ZIPPER to modify its plans is sufficiently fast to ensure, within a reasonable time, that satisfactory communications could be established and maintained between an American controlled and operated base station (perhaps heavily loaded with other commitments) and ZIPPER trained W/T agents in,the field. Frankly, we 'believe I that the existing well-trained 45-55 ZIPPER base station operators should be assigned the task of providing communications to ZIPPER agents. More important, ZIPPER has not accepted the principle that they are recruiting and training WIT and agait teams to be individually integrated into the U.S. intelligence effort in time of war. ZIPPER is obviously holding out for the minimum solu- tion - i.e., a packet of ZIPPER Communications Staff going into action in an American controlled base station to work ZIPPER agents. Thus far we have not taken a flat and unalterable posi- tion with ZIPPER on this matter simply because it is not entirely clear in our own 'minds that the basic policy laid down in WASRA-27784 indicates that we should. However, this unresolved issue is now handicapping our efforts to proceed effectively with vital planning and preparations, and the time has come to hold forthright dis- cussions with ZIPPER on the entire SATURN program. 5. In summary, within the limits of the U.S. and German positions, we appear to have several possible solutions; they are: a. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan ( on the use of an American controlled 'and American Operated base station with U.S. operators contacting ZIPPER WIT agents. b. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan on the use of individual ZIPPER operators in a US controlled and operated base. c. To assist ZIPPER in the development of an adequate outside base station of their own; to base the alternate plan on the use of a packet of ZIPPER operators and communication staff members in a US controlled base. (Preferably separated physically from any other U.S. base station.) d. To assist ZIPPER in the development of a base station (OSMOSIS) capable of handling only limited training and testing F-Net traffic and to base all wartime plans on the use of an American controlled base station staffed with only adequate ZIPPER communication personnel to meet existing ZIPPER requirements. 6. Solution "a" above would appear to be closest to the stated U.S. position. Solution "b" would be consistent with SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY SECRET 645 REL Ger Secret
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.