/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

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2. leadership within the Gire.
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The actual leadership in collecting intelligence is in the hands
of the OVs. Research. recruitment, and training of the V-men, leadership
during their commitment, and regulation of the means of communication, and
support, ars all handled by the GPI with complete independence. The BQ
merely indicates the targets', gives general directions on commitments of
agents, and regulates or watches the use of funds. If the GVe are to carry
out their independent functions, they must be given all the *sans necessary
to the fulfillment of this task. The most important of these today are
technical aids.
Research (rorsohung). recruitment and training of ins is also a
OV function. They have their own personnel at their disposal, as well as
radio sohoole which have the' necessary equipment. It is only in the
technical leadership by radio of the radio agent in plane that the entire
organisation must depend on the central head radio station. The GT is,
therefore, without any direct effectiveness. This situation is in direct
contrast to the system in MAO throughout the organisation. If leadership
is decentralised, the means of leadership must also be decentralised. .1
The centralised radio leadership of the radio agents has already
led to friction; and above all to delays in the transmission of orders
and of reports. Speedy and supple leadership of the radio agents by the
GTs through the medium of a distant radio station which they do not control,
is often impossible. The important individual approach to different radio
agents cannot be mainttned - in spite of the best intentions and efforts
of the osntral radio station - as it could be by a tactical leadership and
support through the OVe. ta. central station. however willing, cannot
meet all the wishes of the GTe since these represent an unbearable bullion,
and will make it difficult to maintain an overall viei, and an orderly
development of the radio traffic. Technical reasons too require a division
of the work by several base stations. The variovA radio agents could be
watched by two base stations simultaneously (GT and Bead base station).
The traffic lost its to technical difficulties (poor sending conditions,
for instance) could be held to a minimum. All of these considerations
argue for the construction of several base stations and their attachment
or subordination to the GVe. • strong influence would, however, be exerted
On them by the head base station.
The development of the Ores radio service, in particular the
steadily growing number of radio agents ready for commit:lent, will force um
in 1954 to consider expanding our base station capacity.
3. BAB■Oontacts in the Berlin Area.
The uprisings on 17 June showed once more how important it is
that we hare a means of readhing agents in the Bast Sector or in the Bast
Zone near Berlin quickly. The best means for this is a one-way ultra short
wave contact. In this way agents could rAceive messages on a normal
receiving set, with an ultra short wave attachment, without endangering
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Secret 758