Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Cooper”12 pages
Secret REL Ger 2. leadership within the Gire. r SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY The actual leadership in collecting intelligence is in the hands of the OVs. Research. recruitment, and training of the V-men, leadership during their commitment, and regulation of the means of communication, and support, ars all handled by the GPI with complete independence. The BQ merely indicates the targets', gives general directions on commitments of agents, and regulates or watches the use of funds. If the GVe are to carry out their independent functions, they must be given all the *sans necessary to the fulfillment of this task. The most important of these today are technical aids. Research (rorsohung). recruitment and training of ins is also a OV function. They have their own personnel at their disposal, as well as radio sohoole which have the' necessary equipment. It is only in the technical leadership by radio of the radio agent in plane that the entire organisation must depend on the central head radio station. The GT is, therefore, without any direct effectiveness. This situation is in direct contrast to the system in MAO throughout the organisation. If leadership is decentralised, the means of leadership must also be decentralised. .1 The centralised radio leadership of the radio agents has already led to friction; and above all to delays in the transmission of orders and of reports. Speedy and supple leadership of the radio agents by the GTs through the medium of a distant radio station which they do not control, is often impossible. The important individual approach to different radio agents cannot be mainttned - in spite of the best intentions and efforts of the osntral radio station - as it could be by a tactical leadership and support through the OVe. ta. central station. however willing, cannot meet all the wishes of the GTe since these represent an unbearable bullion, and will make it difficult to maintain an overall viei, and an orderly development of the radio traffic. Technical reasons too require a division of the work by several base stations. The variovA radio agents could be watched by two base stations simultaneously (GT and Bead base station). The traffic lost its to technical difficulties (poor sending conditions, for instance) could be held to a minimum. All of these considerations argue for the construction of several base stations and their attachment or subordination to the GVe. • strong influence would, however, be exerted On them by the head base station. The development of the Ores radio service, in particular the steadily growing number of radio agents ready for commit:lent, will force um in 1954 to consider expanding our base station capacity. 3. BAB■Oontacts in the Berlin Area. The uprisings on 17 June showed once more how important it is that we hare a means of readhing agents in the Bast Sector or in the Bast Zone near Berlin quickly. The best means for this is a one-way ultra short wave contact. In this way agents could rAceive messages on a normal receiving set, with an ultra short wave attachment, without endangering SECRET/RELEASE 'TO GERMANY ONLY REL Ger Secret 758
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.