Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Headquarters”17 pages
Secret REL Ger SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY CE agents. Therefore, it is the duty of the separate IS offices to inves- tigate mnintermeasures, whereby the mimes acmes can be avoided, Extent,. of the files. Method of safekeeping (concealment). Making rapid identi. fication difficult by means of secret like amd codes. The surest 'pristeotice against kidnapping is concealment of IS activity No clove acquaintanceship between agente and case officers. It was determined that in all kidnapping cases the enemy Carried cut a detailed study of the habits of the subject. Prior compromise va0 a pre- requisite for that Change place time, and method of contacts as often as possible. MO routine. Alertness for opposition observation -and sur- veillence. ftesuanteagura_hat 1. 21DIAL In the °curse of the psit few years, cur organisation, having evaluated prior experienoss has developed a thoroughly thoughUomt security system for agents :ho might be subject to opposition errest. This system has proven itself. It is important, hierever, not to stop at the level already reached, but to improve and refine the system contin- ually. The roll .op of whole nets by the opposition in the form of a chain reaction, as a result of the arrest of agents, could generally be avoided.. In the case. of flapshaving their origin with agents in the CDR which tack on major proportions, it has been definitely determined that the ,fault lav Ina failure to heed our baste pecm4tvroaes. • The flaps described in Section D were caused on another plane (choice of case officer personnel, thoughtlessness, dompeunding of case officer errors). But the fact that these flaps had the results they did, and that the enemy-gainedanah 'widespread knowledge concerning our opera- tions, proves that vs deviated 'from the decisive, basic IS rules in the course of tiloof ItOSILESDAM-DIMOYASIDEUMiLiDADZSEMM- military rules. but not along the lines of IS nrincitdee. The dangers which existed for ease officer personnel in the West, , whether in the case of treason or as a result of enemy violence, were ignored. It is there- fare necessary to subjeot our methods of operation to a critical examina- tion in this regard, amd to operate even in the Vest in the future in a professional manner and with regard to security principles. It would .exseed the coops of this study to give details concerning the change in oir operational methods. It is esSentially the job of the offices to . draw the necessary conolusiOne, based on the indicated flap experiences aid Consistent with the mission and the practical work of the office. . WiAlggedgiMjnaliejanitandSZAjaeach ceps pram • in.,§1174E.r..sumaustuaturitleagaz42-tickT/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY 735 REL Ger Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.