Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Cairo”1 page
Secret REL Ger SECRET/RELEASE TO GERMANY ONLY f.. EMployees carry out double functions (e.g., courier, spotter, reoruiter).. This increaces the danger not only for the agent but also .... for those persona who are in °outset with him. In exceptional oases where this cannot he avoided, the increased risk meet be ocnsidered, and muet he ocuntertalanced.by appropriate additions/ 'sour* measures,. gm Couriers served several agents at the sake time,* were used in anotherJob after their activity had ended. Complications and losses which cannot be excused rrom a seourity point of view retained from the arrest of such a courier. This also holds true for radio trans- part couriers. h. Transfer of agents and case officers below the Zweigstelle Ss to be avoided, since difficulties in both the old and new field bases can arise therefrom. 1. In regard to training quarters (especially radio), we must make sure that a short aireuit from one flap cannot carry aver. inte. inother net via these quarters. In general, only gm training area for each radio operator or agent (sic). .5; The IS training of aradio operator (including security training) must bacarried out, from the. beginning, continuously and according to plan, and may not be neglected in striving, for a rapid end to the radio training. 1. The point of departure for our work in the CDR should not be United to West Serlinalone since. the opposition, because of this knowledge, concentrates the main part of its CR activities there. -It was again and again determined that the enemy has a goad surveillanea, system at his disposal. Therefore a general loosening (sic) toward the .Federal Republic is necessary. This measure is supported by the easing Of interzone travel regulations. Use of cover addresses in the Federal Republic. Training in the Federal Republic. • 1. Personality files on employees of the neighboring bransh office in whichILEIRBACR formerly worked, were included Among the IIRIRB1CR dtmuments. As a result of this situation which resulted from Irresponsible action, agents lost their freedomcom;letely unnecessarily, and the. flap spread . to another .branch office. With the erection of each new office or the change Of a case officer, the immediately superior office has the responsibility of carrying out a detailed examination or the written material. • m. The MAW and SCHULTZ flaps had far ...reaching consequences for agents in the GDR because the earl files of agente there were kept in the offices of the branches, and the enemywas able to gain possession of these files. Since the enemy is informed as to the manner of keeping personnel riles in the branch offices, it will also be his goal in the retire to gain access to these records 117 farce or .tW SLEM17111EtEASE TO GERMANY ONLY REL Ger Secret SEE 734
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.