Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Mission Control”1 page
Secret REL Ger SECRET/RELEASE S-"Eml TO GERMANY ONLY-7- perconal contact vith his immediate subordinetee, and must oonoerm himeolf with their private lives, in orderto be able to recognise and interpret any change in their temperaments. a. Cs0.....0Z1,t482 _now- Pe Li The success and security of our work, and the.aocomplintnents and the livee of our oources are primarily dependent upon the worth and the unobjectionable cheract4. of our case officers, particularly those on the branch office level. This must be taken as an important point of departure in the selection and use of new case officers. Independent of this, the security system aunt to so constructed that lies, suppressions and embeeslements can be recognized in good time or avoided. Every possibility for indepen- dent checking of the case officer (e.g., queationing of a dropped agent) must be utilised. When shortcomings have been noted, they have not always been attacked with the necessary-speed arid consistency. In such case*, loss of souroes and expenditure of money must also be reckoned with. Aside from apse Oheckiag at the time of employment, only continuous watchfulness and controls are of aemistanes againettreason within our own ranks. A critical attitude must be maintained aeon with competent and proven colleagues. No blind trust. On the other band, it most be the task and art of the case officer to make sure that control measures', for example, are not taken as mistrust, and that those affected are not antagonised. In regard to available points of attack, it is neceesery to recognise all posaitle moans of pressure, and to nullify those which an unscrupulous enemy could use, uoder certain circumstanoes, for his own ends. The creation of a situation of confidence is necessary, so that each employee will report any indication of a hostile approach immediately, and will have the feeling that his superior headquarters will do every- thing tor his protection, and that assistance is available to him. be &tag • With agents, the possibility must always be kept in mind • that they may come under boatile control in the course of their activities and reveal all of their knowledge, or that they may be turned r the opposition. Therefore the agent should not know any facts that are not absolutely necessary for the execution of his mission. Thus, critical judgment of all reports from the security point of view (fabrication,. striking change in level Of accomplishment, deficient or oon.oxiatent deecription of method used to obtain information, etc.). Basically, do not make judgments only from subjective impressions, but always) look for objective indications and place these in the foreground in the judgment of a person, -Noting and checking of all unusual events or other observe- . SECRET/RtEASE tions (e.g, controls, imminence, &o fromnes a meetipg e TO GERMANY 0It:EL Ger 727 Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.