/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

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(4) Coupling of transport, peastraticm and travelling
sources for the following-up of transports.
(5) Delivery of reports in person (frequent, =latices; '-
regular trips to Berlin), by courier (via dead letter
drops), by nail er by radio. Phasing on of important
massages by redio trom Went Berlin.
. .
(6) Security. Erection of special come channels in addi-
tion to the reporta/initructions and supply channel,'
Methods used in West Berlin (meetings, telephone letter
drops, Cover addressee). Use of cover legends at the
target and an tripe to Berlin. Name trace requestso
(7) Support of agente after thoy have left enemy territory,
and meat:sures taken for legalisation of agents, i
r .- §gmearx
A large part of the ELVIN presumably gave the enemy nothing
now of importance; e.g.,.the enemy naturally knew that in the field of
trinaportatica we were especially interested in traffic over the Oder
herder. On the other hand, the opposition, with ecoapsrehensive knowledge
of our EEl l e ard the revolts of our work, can direct his security efforts
primarily toward the targets and groups of persons in which we are Inter,
elated. The knowledge of our methods of mark makes the detection and
arrest of our agents easier for the opposition. .
It must be pointed out that ..-Independently of the cauees of
the maps—this segpreheneive knowledge on the part of the enemy results
from mistakes in management. Nnah too much written material was given to
the lower field sub bases which are in direct contact with' agent personnel;
NE/ 0e, instructions, administrative correspondence, etc., were sent out as
a matteroeroUtine in unabridged form, and little or no practice was spade
of destruction or return of 'documents. The fact that a detailed reason or
basic was given in instructions proved to be especially compromising and
momentous, e.g., no approach to Kr. X, since already in contact with allied
service.
Controls in regard to number and maintenance. of documents
were carried out only to an insufficient degree.
3.. hurgnotalaggpon gmd Lealerealis
The choice of staff employees and agents and their psychologically
correct handling represent the decisive problem, not only for a further
.increase in our acoomPliehments,,bat also for the security of our organ-
isation. It is note than ever necessary to consider the human and personal
affairs and the environment. of eut personnel, in addition to judging their
official accomplishments. The case officer mugititat
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