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/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 218 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.

  • p. 5 …is to a /AMIM *tat due te'the • desire to, afore ;bade& s cooperation, end, Sismi…
  • p. 46 …lereioe end, ile..hops,,,s friendly end cooperating cmes , Pot our present luer,ore.tica 1itsbnlasts…
  • p. 56 …All preparations and plans for such an • eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the DS…
  • p. 64 …between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al- most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the…
  • p. 73 …countries overseas; others are recruited for IS- cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or…
  • p. 112 …Gehlen who closely cooperates With the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches…
  • p. 116 …close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past…
  • p. 128 Secret REL Ger intelligence -- 4 • Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up…
  • p. 135 …Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin the untsovering of…
  • p. 170 …Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy…
  • p. 187 …is far outweighed • by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection…
  • p. 188 …To what extent this will event—: - ually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus…
Secret
REL Ger
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10 In Attachments 1, 2 and 3, the circumstances and genesis of
the MUELLER, ERHARDT and SCHULTZ flaps are briefly portrayed. An
overly detailed description Wan consoiciudy avoided, aim* thereby
(a) allied units would learn unnecessary operational details, end
(b) this study would take on too great a circumference. The purpose
of the description of the flaps is to recognise the lemidenty and
associations which led to the experiencee and conclusions treated in
Sections C and D.
C.
gp EzeorIenees and Soureeg of Error
.1. &lemma* of the ()monition.
Our espionage activity stands opposed to a powerfhl enemy,
armed with .all the trappings of power—the Soviet IS. The state
security services in the satelLite states (In which the GDR I. Included
in thin instance) carry out their counter-espionage activities under
the guidance and at the order of the Soviet IS. The executive organs
of the state, and a close meshed control and surveillance system, stand
at the disposal of these state security services. Furthermore, exten-
sive opposition surveillance Actions in West Berlin, Which seemed to
have been bescd.on goad training and organisation, have , been
In many cases the surveillance was not noticed by those eurveilled, but
was determined only later (e.g., during the interrogation of agents).
The opposition seeks to attain its goal 4th the use of all CEmethodea
It infiltrated agents of its service into our organisation; was fro..
quently successful in doubling our agents; was in some cases able to
work its CE agents u0 in headquarters of the branch office level;
strived to recruit IS case officer personnel located in the West; and
turned again andagain to violence.
For two years, opposition endeavor has been characterised more
and more by dissatisfaction with the arrest of single agents, and the
shifting of the main part of their activity toward penetration of hand-
ling headquarters in the West, in order to be able to 'destroy whole nets.
The experiences of the 1953 flaps show that the recognisable attacks had
as their primary goal the handling offices in West Berlin. A total of
three hootile CE agents were directed against the KLEINBACR cell on
various levels. The enemy was working here on a long-range plan, and,
Eu_RLI
TO GERMANY ONLY
REL Ger
723 Secret
SECRET/RELEASE

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.