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/specialCollection/nwcda2/51/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2/CIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BND, 1949-56 VOL. 2_0002.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 218 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.

  • p. 5 …is to a /AMIM *tat due te'the • desire to, afore ;bade& s cooperation, end, Sismi…
  • p. 46 …lereioe end, ile..hops,,,s friendly end cooperating cmes , Pot our present luer,ore.tica 1itsbnlasts…
  • p. 56 …All preparations and plans for such an • eventuality are made in closest cooperation with the DS…
  • p. 64 …between ZIPPER and the BrIr is deplorable; cooperation is al- most non-existent: ZIPPER provides the…
  • p. 73 …countries overseas; others are recruited for IS- cooperation by Allied IS authorities. Only worthless individuals or…
  • p. 112 …Gehlen who closely cooperates With the Adenauer Government in West Germany and who keeps several branches…
  • p. 116 …close cooperation with the State agencies of security. The papers cited other cases in the past…
  • p. 128 Secret REL Ger intelligence -- 4 • Cooperation is close, without question. The organization has been turning up…
  • p. 135 …Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin the untsovering of…
  • p. 170 …Once a continuing contact is established, cooperative work on details will develop. The stress on secrecy…
  • p. 187 …is far outweighed • by the value of cooperation with KUBARK in this field. Thus, the collection…
  • p. 188 …To what extent this will event—: - ually effect our cooperative effort with the ZIPPER intelligence apparatus…
mau
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Secret
REL Ger
SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY
In order to strengthen his position. He wanted to prove to the people of
the Et Zone that Weetern espionage activity would be destroyed in the
East Zone under his leadership, and that a new 17th of June would'no..,.
longer be possible.
b. Strengthening of the position of the SSD. The people of the
East Zone were to be brought to see that the existence of the SSD and its
further expansion was neoessary. •
e. Destruction of the confide-nee and sense of escurity of our..
agents in the Zone, with the purpose of causing them to discontinue
their work or to report to the SSD.
d. Frightening the populace of the East Zone from letting •
themselves be used by Western services, especially by this organisation.
Propaganda effect on the people, in order to get them to cooperate lin
the untsovering of Western agents, in the interests of the state. •
e. Attempt to confuse and paralyze our Field Bailee, making
them fee/ exposed as a result of the publicity.
f. Influencing the Berlin Four-Power Conference, which was
scheduled to convene soon.
g. Making political difficulties for our organisation in Meet
Germany.
6, asefLegkolthempaition prooaeanda on our agents MP
astonishine)7 slight. The morale of the agents and their confidence in
the organication could, with very few exceptions, not be shaken. Our
agents were stuffed for years by the Soviet Zoos bosses with propaganda
based on lies, so this present action did not make a convincing impres-
sion and thus blew up. The SSD 9 8 attempts to induce all our agents to
report to them was without MOM. Opposition claims that 31 of our
agents had confessed in remorse, are Untrue and pure oppOrtunietio
propaganda. Not a single case of this is known. Also, no objective
proofs could be given by the Soviet Zone authorities.
7. From the technical IS point of dew, the opposition succeeded
in 1953 in making some penetrations of our organisation, and in dealing
us a number of severe blows. Much at we deplore the fate of the
affected agents and their families, it must be pointed out that this
had to do only with certain nets, and, therefore, our espionage
operations in general were in no way paralyzed or decisively diminished.
On the other hand, the penetrations by the opposition should be a force-
ful warning to VA and a stimulus to learn more from these experiences
than before, and to take more effective security measures in the future,
SECRET/RELEASE
Lox TO GERMANY ONLY
REL Ger
Secret 722

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.