Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release, declassified in 2007 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, is part of the collection CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56, Volume 2, in the section on ZIPPER operations and counterintelligence. It contains early 1950s memoranda on Russian, Ukrainian and other emigre groups, a plan for a stay-behind network and for evacuating ODEUM staff if war broke out, a JUPITER status report dated 16 April 1951, and evaluations of Zipper reports. It does not discuss UFOs.
“Headquarters”17 pages
DISTRIBUTION gE CTIE-COM) 3 CCM 31111Pbe 51-28A 15 July 53' • Secret REL Ger P.16-4 r), , L, YIFLd-J1 r: r; I:11112T VIA: TO GERMANY OK patch No WA. 4555 To . Chief, EE FROM : Chief of Bass; Pullach INFO: COM BOB .7(8peolty air or ran pouch) • P 16 JUL 1953 Date SOWNCT: GE1qERAL- 811t01110-- OPERATIONAL Intelligence Lessons from the June Uprisings in the GDR 1.. It is completely false to judgeear , wiar: by the performance of any organization during prior to ti 17 riots. None of the characteristics that could be expected to precede the outbreak of hostilities were preeent. 2. We think ZIPPER's intelligence performance was quite satisfactory althóugh not outstanding. Courier lines through West Berlin failed on the 17th; by the 18th the use of 11T and quickly restored courier channels was proViding sufficient information to provide a oontrolled OB picture. The Soviets could not have effected a major regroupment of troops without our knowledge. 3. The supporters in ZIPPER of alarge OT program feel that the sound- uses of their position has been proven; emphasis in the next year will be an more and better 'NA operations tied in with the best sources. 4. The entire ZIPPER intelligence apparatus has been thoroughly teeted during this crisis . dozens of minor changes in communications methods, signal plans, staff procedures, etc., will be made on the basis of less one learned. 5. The ZIPPER Reports and Analysia staff concentrated on getting out evaluated but fragmentary raw information for the consumption of trained analysta...partioularV in the OB field. Thus, PULL cables were not always in useable form for addressees without access to OB analysts. ZIPPER and POE failed in the reporting field by not diverting part of the energy to production of periodic cable summaries of the over-all situation in SovZons; these would have been particularly valuable for Bonn, Berlin, Parisend senior KUBARK officials. . 6. Most frustrating to PCB were reports .thati (a) .at USAREUR PULL . cables for first ten days after outbreak of riots were erroneously diverted.: Within 'MAWR and did not reach OS analysts; (b) at Bonn PULL cables for BAOR were undelivered; (o) in Berlin PULL tables were too fragmentary and 695 REL Get Secret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 218 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.