Documents / FOIA release
This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency dispatch from a Chief of Station to the Chief, Foreign Division, released in 2006 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. It assesses the operational potential of the Hungarian emigre group led by Andras Zako, including its KOPJAS and MHBK elements. It reports that the group passed off refugee debriefings as agent reports, and it concludes that the group is politically worthless and unfit to serve as an intelligence or resistance network. The "UFO" in the text is an OCR error, not a reference to aerial phenomena.
1 •_ • - • - ^ • •••• ■ y • _ ■ _•-- ■ • • ,• NAliae (8143i52), 1 t • : the eiteetion. Any military cooperation must, herever, be bored on the primary condition that the Western powers .1 break diplomatic relations with the Soviet government in Budapest, that they recognise a government-in-es-1)v, and that they assure through state treaties that oral; drop of Hungarian blood shed on battlefields however distant will serve (,he liberation of our country." ' iehos to point out that in his statement to Huilgerie.0 ; . • . epecifictitiy avoids mentioning the Hungarian National Council int epethe - inateo4 of "a unified and potent leadership." In our interpretation, !hie mean, that he is unwilling to accept the Council in its present structure ,and —far from being apolitical as he claims to be--that he has indeed greet political ambitions. I • :•.;;;2 .9. ' With regard to aCKHARDT's efforts to . gain the mipport of the OBE, I it is hard to believe he is unaware that the military onset, cf the 1719X are extremely limited; it is more likely that he seeks ISM backtng to in- craw° his influence within the Counoll and to give his greater pot e ntial ; I , popular euffort. As it is, he could harily hope to gain popular alpport • in Hangary equal to that which the Counoil i s mare liberal elesentercould • arouse. 10.' It- is important that the truo status of the ZAKB-MITP. camplex be known At ell times because the patently effective salesmanship nf the graap causes Mie question or support to be raised from many different ouertere • and levele, It met be recognized that the basic motivation in polllicel and that no "come-on" plane can be accepted without most cereal scrutiny. If ZAK0 had Applied the same skill end effort to building up in inteltigenett • not or reeistance movement within Hungary that he has to achieriug end mato- taining his position in the emigre /memo, he would have been Inneneely reenceseni. Our conolaelon is that the group approach is not foteltie in this cant,. The only potentially succeseful method of obtainini intelligence • coverage within Ileneeu is through selected individual's. As prctiounly stated, we have failud thus far to diacnver assets at the diepaeel of %MO • or SCKHADT which would prove that they have something to offer in exchange :far any sapport we might extend. The exception is, of course, the eporoxi- . mately 1500 men ZAK° could muster from Anstria and Otrmarkv after a tads of operattoen had been provided. ZAKO t e group mould prove to be effjcieot jr . direct military action and, eventually, in acts Of sabotage directed against the eatellite nations. Considered as a political unit--whieh'it definitely is--the group is absolutely worthless. Taken as a group, the eztgrrs have been ehown to be ee woefully lacking in natters of security preneut!ans ard political wisdom that, seen against the background of e auch-r:wpromieed pent, they are uhally unfit for use as a basis for a Hungarian resist see grt s up on an intelligence network. So tar we have been unable to find a member of the group who tould merit our attention or efforts to win hie loyalty. We re: commended s direct suproach to ZAKO only because we did not' want to feel t',1t. We right have overlooked some potentiality worthy of support. •
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 5 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.