Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top Seret Front. A Warsaw Pact joint forces formation that fuses of shorter duration) his would be formed in wartime to carry out operational tactic has been used in an c ort to trap aircraft on or strategic tasks. A front would be roughly analogous airfields immediately before larger attacks on those to a NATO army group and its associated allied facilities. Soviet planners also intend to use runway tactical air force mining as the only form of attack against some airfields. Front Air Force. The operational-size air formation that would be fully integrated into each joint forces Operational. The level of military theory, command, front. Front air forces would be equipped primarily and planning between strategic and tactical in the with fighter-type aircraft drawn from the peacetime Soviet hierarchy of military concepts. Operational air forces of the Soviet military districts and groups of military theory, objectives, and plans concern the forces and from the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) conduct of joint forces operations using front-, army-, national air forces. Front air forces headquarters and corps-size groupings of tactical-level forces. Oper- would coordinate and control all air forces combat ations are carried out over hundreds of kilometers of activity in the front's sector of operations. territory and take several days of combat to complete. They require extensive stafT planning and direction to ensure proper coordination among subordinate tacti- Front Aviation. The Soviet term for the branch of the cal-level forces and the provision of substantial rear Soviet Air Forces that equips and trains the predom- services support. The term "operational" is also used inately fighter-type units that would be directly sub- by the Soviets to describe a piece of equipment that is ordinate to the fronts. These front air forces would used by operational-size forces and weapons intended' provide most of the air forces support to joint forces for striking targets in the operational depth, front and army operations Operational Axis. One of the sectors into which the Front Operation. An operation planned and directed strategic zones of TMOs are divided for planning by a front headquarters to pursue an operational or front and army operations. Fronts typically would be strategic goal along one to three operational axes assigned one to three operational axes, and one or two within a TMO. Front operations would be conducted armies or corps would operate along each axis. The according to a unified plan inc no sting all forces in boundaries of the operational axes could be changed the front's sector of operations during the course of a TMO strategic operation to adjust to changes in the enemy force disposition or General Staff. The central Soviet military authority changes in the objectives of the strategic operation.| |for planning and for controlling all Soviet and NSWP armed forces. In wartime, the General StalT would act as the executive agent of the Soviet Supreme High Operational Depth. A Soviet targeting term for the Command. area occupied by NATO forces that are the second echelons of the frontline NATO army corps and army High Command. The headquarters that would act as groups. This depth typically is portrayed as beginning an extension of the Soviet General Staff for control- 25 to 40 kilometers behind the forward edge of the ling the strategic grouping of forces encompassing all battle area (FEBA) and ending at a depth of 200 to Soviet and NSWP armed forces in one of the main 400 km. The Soviets also use the term "immediate TMOs. It would plan and direct the strategic opera- operational depth" to describe the area from directly tions in its TMO at the behest of the Soviet Supreme behind the first-echelon NATO divisions to a depth of High Command, at least 70 to 90 kilometers, and possibly up to 150 kilometers, through which NATO's frontline army Mining of Runways. Closing runways at enemy air- corps would advance reinforcements for commitment fields by attacking them with bombs that have de- to battle layed-action fuses (we know the Soviets have fuses with delays of six to 18 hours, and they probably have tod'a erL 82
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.