Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
Top Secret Table 9 Estimated Soviet Perceptions of Likely Starting Air Balances in the Western TMO a NATO Warsaw Pact Air Forces Air Forces _ Force 3F-2S' Force 3F-3S r Force 4F-3S Force 5F-3S 0 Unreinforced 1.05:1 1.10:1 ________________ (L40:l (1.55:1 _________ M+3 1.20:1 1.0s:1 05: - -- - - -- -(1.30:1) (1.45:11 _ _ _ (1.60:1) M+5 1.10:1 1+ :1 1.10:1 MI+7 1.15:1 1.05:1 1.0(5:1 11.40:1) (1.50:1) (1-6:1) M+10 1.10:1 1+:1 (1.45:1) (1.601:1) M+ 14 1.05:1 (1.55:1) - Warsaw Pact advantages arc shown in red; NATO advantages, in carriers are not included. The USAF reinforcement schedule is black. The air balance calculations are based on mid-1983 air similar to that assumed by NATO, with most of the early order-of-battle-data and Sovict unitary combat potential-scores. reinforcements being F-IS fighter-interceptors (which have high The primary figures in each case are based on combat potential, combat potential scores). and the smaller numbers in parentheses reflect simple air order of a Warsaw Pact Force 3F-2S includes three front air forces (Polish. battle. In the belief that neither NATO nor the Pact could conduct GDR. GSFG-GDR. and Czechoslovak-CGF) and two strategic air major reinforcements for extended periods of time without a armies (Legnica and Smolensk), as well as the non-Soviet Warsaw response from the other side, we have not depicted force balance Pact fighter-interceptors and the Baltic leet Air Force. Force 3F- calculations for force combinations that we estimate the Soviets 3S adds the Vinnitsa strategic air army, Force 4F-3S also adds the would view as unlikely to occur. Belorussian Front Air Force, and Force SF-3S also adds thei The unreinforced NATO forces include the air forces of 2ATAF, Carpathian Front Air Force. 4ATAF, Denmark, the FRG naval air arm, and about 70 percent of the French Air Force. British home interceptor forces and aircraft Air Balances in Air Operation Sectors. The Soviets' struggle for air supremacy. We cannot describe this military writings indicate that by 1981 they had variant in detail, but we are able to estimate some of developed a new variant of the air operation for air the likely characteristics of its scheme of execution by supremacy, It was designed to overcome the predica- analyzing the air balance in the context of known ment - sed by the Soviets' doctrinal requirement for a Soviet air operation planning considerations. substantial air balance advantage at the start of the ' ' air operation and their apparent expectation of near parity in the TMO-wide air balance. In this variant, We believe that operational considerations would play rather than attacking across the full width of the a greater role in determining the number of "opera- Western TMO, the Soviets would concentrate the tional axes" (sectors) in the air operation than would massed air raids sequentially in smaller sectors- air balance calculations, despite the fact that the thereby achieving substantial advantages in each sec- sector attack variant evidently was created expressly tor only while it is being attacked. If the Soviets intend to attempt to seize the strategic initiative in the air at the outset of a war with NATO, this variant probably is their preferred form of combat in the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.