Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top \ecret The substantial Pact air balance advantage in the likely starting qualitative air balance in the Western mid-1970s is reduced to near parity by 1980 in our TMO would be one of near parity. Moreover, they estimate because we assume that in the late 1970s the probably also believe that it is unlikely that either side Soviets introduced new counting rules for calculating could achieve a sufficient lead in mobilization and the air balance. Our scores data indicate the Soviets reinforcement to establish a substantial air balance had switched from multiple to unitary combat poten- advantage. The peacetime in-place air forces on both tial scores by 1977, and our analysis of Soviet percep- sides are so large that it would take a massive tions of the air balance in 1975 leads us to speculate reinforcement by one side in concert with the other's that this switch probably occurred after 1975. Of relative inactivity to substantially shift the starting ual importance to our calculations balance. Both sides have sufficient air forces reserves Soviet planners pro a ly to alter the balance, but a reinforcement of that started by 1977 to count French forces as part of magnitude would take at a minimum most of a week NATO from the outset of hostilities. All of the air (perhaps as much as two weeks) and considerable balance shift between 1975 and 1980 in our calcula- logistic support to prepare and execute. We believe tions is attributable to the addition of about 70 that typically conservative Soviet planners would as- percent of the French Air Force to the NATO air sume that neither side would be able to conceal forces and to applying unitary rather than multiple preparations on that scale for more than a couple of combat potential scores to NATO multirole fighter- days, and that once detected, it would likely trigger a bombers. Force modernization is not a major contrib- reciprocal response from the other side.i utor to the air balance shift in our calculations, because there is no significant change in the balance If our air balance calculations arc representative of between 1975 and 1980 if the combat potential scores Soviet estimates, the Soviets expect that neither side are applied using the same method in both ears and would be likely to amass a TMO-wide qualitative air if the French are excluded balance advantage greater than about 1.2:1 at the outset of war, despite a Pact advantage of about 1.4:1 We estimate that in 1980 the Soviets projected fur- to 1.6:1 in the numbers of deployed combat aircraft ther NATO gains in the qualitative air balance by (table 9). Even in the highly unlikely event that the 1985 but that a situation of near parity would contin- Pact was able to deploy a force as large as our ue to exist (table 8). Unlike the preceding five years, hypothetical Force 5F-3S against an unreinforced however, NATO's gains between 1980 and 1985 are NATO, the Pact would have only a 1.30:1 qualitative due to its higher rate of qualitative improvement advantage TMO-wide. Moredver, we estimate that through force modernization than that of the Warsaw the US Tactical Air Command's planned reinforce- Pact, rather than to changes in Soviet estimative ment after three days of mobilization would more techniques. This higher rate of improvement is almost than offset the addition of the Vinnitsa air army in entirely attributable to the introduction of substantial Soviet calculations of the air balance and that the numbers of F-16s and Tornados-both of which the planned US reinforcement force after 14 days of Soviets score much higher than the Pact MIG-23/27 mobilization would counterbalance the addition of and SU-24 counterparts during this period. We did that air army and the Belorussian and Carpathian -not perform air balance projections for the less pre- Front air forces. In our estimate, we assume the dictable years beyond 1985, but we believe the Soviets Soviets count about 70 percent of the French Air may hope to halt NATO's gains-and perhaps reverse Force as part of the NATO forces-the exclusion of them-if they are able to introduce enough SU-27 which would turn a typical 1.05:1 NATO advantage and MIG-29 fighters during the late 1980s and the in our calculations into a Pact advantage of 1.05:1 to 1990s, because they may view these aircraft as being 1.10:1 (depending on the extent of the reinforcement qualitatively comparable to the F-15 and F-16,.which period). they regard highly The Current TMO-Wide Balance. Our analysis sug- gests the Soviets now probably perceive that the most 73 Top 'ecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.