Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
TophSecret Table 8 Estimated Soviet Perceptions of Trends in the Western TMO Air Balance, 1975 to 1985 a Air Forces Disposition h 1975, Using 1975, Using 1980, Using 1985.Using Unitary Scoresc Multple Scores Unitary Scores ' Unitary Scorcso NATO: Unreinforced 1.25:1 1.55:1 1.10:1 1.15:1 Warsaw Pact:Force 3F-2S NATO: Unreinforced NA N- N I 1 I Warsaw Pact: Force 3F-3S NATO: Unrcinforced 1.35:1 1.701:1 1.25:1 1.10:I Warsaw Pact: Force 4F-3S NATO: Unrcinforced 1.50:1 L85:1 1.45:1 1.20:1 Warsaw Pact: Force 5F-3S Warsaw Pact advantages arc shown in red: NATO advantages, in r In the unitary scorescalculations, all aircraft that the Sovicts black, consider to be multirole aircraft are multiplied by a set of combat h These force pairings were selected to illustrate a broad range of potential scoresthat treat them as ftghter-interceptors, whereas in possibilities for the Warsaw Pact, but we do not believe the Soviets the multiple scores calculations the multirole aircraft in fighter- view all of these pairings as likely situations (the unreinforced bomber units are multiplied by estimated ground attack role NATO versus Warsaw Pact Force SF-3S is particularly unlikely). combat potential scares. Th unreinforced NATO air forces include 2ATAF, 4ATAF. the Danish Air Force, the FRG naval air arm, and about 70 percent of the French Air Force. Warsaw Pact Force 3F-2S includes three front air forces (Polish-GDR. GSFG-GDR, and Czechoslovak- CGF) and two strategic air armies (Legnica and Smolensk), as well as the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact fighter-interceptors and the Baltic Fleet Air Force in 1985, and similar forces under different subordination in 1975 and 1980. Warsaw Pact Force 3F-3S adds the Vinnitsa strategic air army (1985 only). Warsaw Pact Force 4F-3S also adds the Delorussian Front Air Force, and Warsaw Pact Force 5F-35 also adds the Carpathian Front Air Force. attack role combat potential scores "0for NATO replaced by the unitary scores until the late 1970s-a multirolc fighter-bombers, but advantages of only time when the Soviets were introducing several other 1.25:1 to 1.5:1 when we apply the unitary combat new, more conservative, operational planning norms potential scores. This leads us to speculate that the for their theater forces. multiple scores for each aircraft may not have been Our estimate of the air balance in 1980 is consistentWe had to develop an ersatz set of combat potential scoresfor our with Soviet military writings from the late 1970s and estimate of the 1975 air balance bated on multiple scoresfor esch aircraft type because we lacked the necessary Soviet data. Most of early 1980s, which express concern over near parity in these weapon scores date from the late 1970s and are Soviet unitary the air balance and are preoccupied with the need toscores. We derived the ground attack scoresfor multirole aircraft develop less desirable alternatives to a TMO-wide airfrom the same data baseby analogy. For example, we gave the F-4 the same score in the ground attack role as the MIG-27 because the operation. According to our calculations (table 8), the Soviets assign similar unitary scores to the F-4 and the MIG-23 Warsaw Pact would have had little or no chance in(the MIG-27 isa fghter-bomber variant of theMIG-23 fighter- 1980 of achieving a doctrinally favorable qualitativeinterceptor). Likewise, we made the F-104 ground attack score the same as the SU-7, which is the fighter-bomber counterpart to the advantage for launching a TMO-wide air operation at MIG-21 fighter-interceptor (the Soviets give similar unitary scores the outset of war. We cannot be certain, however, thatto the F-to4G and the MIG-21BIS). We believe this technique the perceived air balance shift between 1975 and 1980produces scores that correspond reasonably with Soviet perceptions , in the late 1970s of relative ground attack potential, but we cannot occurred i the Sovicts' estimates for the same rea- be certain that they accurately reflect Soviet perceptions in the sons that it did in our estimate. early-to-middle 1970. ToSre 72
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.