Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Sea”15 pages
To NSecret this force, because their attacks against targets in Soviets include in their calculations of the air balance Britain would bring the British home interceptor when planning the air supremacy campaign. We force into our calculations of the overall air believe the Sovicts count only those aircraft that they balance-to the noticeable disadvantage of the expect to become actively engaged in those operations, Warsaw Pact. because this has been their normal practice in Ian- ning other types of operationsInformation - The third force, Force 4F-3S, adds a fourth front indicated that at least 600 aircraft air force. We used the Belorussian Front, as it is in-the home air forces of Britain, Spain, and Portugal most frequently the fourth front committed to battle probably would be excluded from the total of 2,700 to in Western TMO = This force disposition 2,900 aircraft, because they were still listed by the probably is not appropriate for short warning see- Soviets as NATO's second strategic air echelorf] narios, because we believe the Soviets intend to use \Ve believe, base on their front air forces as integral components of their general characterizations of the NATO air forces in joint forces fronts, rather than committing them to imilitary writings, that the Soviets ex- battle in a piecemeal fashion. pect 2ATAF, 4ATAF. the Danish Air Force, the FRG naval air arm, most or all of the French Air - The fourth force, Force SF-3S, adds the Carpathian Force, and possibly aircraft carriers in the North Sea front air force-usually the fifth front in Western to be participants in the initial struggle for Central TMO| This isthe largest force Soviet European air supremacy. The Soviets do not typically planners probably would assume they could assem- include the Swedish Air Force in their descriptions of ble before the outbreak of war. Moreover, the the NATO air forces in the Western TMO, although Soviets may prefer not to use five fronts in the first they could conceivably count portions of that force in strategic echelon because it would leave them with the first strategic air echelon. little in reserve to commit to the subsequent cam- paign through France We excluded from our calculations several small NATO forces components, but we are uncertain It is not clear whether the Soviets in their calculations whether the Soviets would count them. Consequently, reduce the number of available aircraft in these forces our force ratio estimates may favor the Warsaw Pact to account for operational readiness rates and nuclear slightly more than do Soviet calculations. We omit reserves. We did not compensate for these factors in aircraft carriers, as it is not clear whether or under our calculations, because we believe such factors have what conditions the Soviets believe they would be little or no effect on the resultant force ratios in Soviet used in the North Sea. Adding two US carrier air calculations. The Soviets usually ascribe to NATO wings in our calculations could increase a typical their own planning norms when they estimate aircraft 1.05:1 qualitative air balance advantage for NATO availabilit Because they often into a 1.10:1 or 1.15:1 advantage (depending on the exclude support aircra t sue as reconnaissance air- extent of other reinforcements). We did not count the craft) from their tabulations of combat aircraft l fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft based in southern nd because we do not know if and southwestern France (because they probably support aircra are included in the air supremacy would not be employable from their home airfields) campaign air balance calculations, we decided to omit and the Mirage IV bombers (which have only a them from our calculations. We also have excluded nuclear delivery role). The British home interceptor attack helicopters because the Soviets have not in- forces also were excluded (assuming no Bison or Bear eluded them in their planning of air and air defense attacks against targets in Britain early in the war), operation: NATO Air Forces Participants. It is unclear how many NA TO combat aircraft- the Top\ecre 70
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.