Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top Secret Appendix C Force Ratio Analysis The Soviets' military writings indicate that their the Central European air balance using the Soviets' planners take force ratio norms into consideration combat potential scores, neverthcless, are generally when they decide which of their employment concepts consistent with their perceptions of the balance as are most appropriate for a given situation and when expressed in their military writings - they try tocrcatcan-o.timum disposition of forces. In writings| the force ratio calculations arc Warsaw Pact Air Forces Participants. We use four made by multiplying each side's order of battle by a different Pact force dispositions in our calculations- set of static weapon system combat potential scores. a baseline estimate and three sequential air reinforce- These scores represent a rough approximation of the ment packages that are consistent witi :ovict relative ability of each weapon system to inflict losses logistic considccrations: on the enemy. They were developed by the Soviet General Staff, which used linear formulas in conjunc- The baseline force, Force JF-2S. reflects a minimal- tion with small- and large-scale models of combat ly reinforced posture that comprises three front air operations. The Soviets consider the resultant force forces and two strategic air armies. These are the ratios a simple and effective way to compare the air forces of the Polish-GDR, Group of Soviet combat potential of similar types of technically ad- Forces, Germany (GSFG)-GDR, and Czechoslo- vanccdforces. vak-Central Group of Forces (CGF) fronts and the Legnica and Smolensk strategic air armies. This The Soviets' writings in the early 1980s indicated that force also includes the Baltic Fleet air forces and the they were researching more advanced ways to esti- second-echelon non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) mate force balances-which probably will lead, as in interceptors-although it is likely that these inter- the past, to the adoption of a new method for using ceptors would participate only in an air defense combat potential scores. One proposal involved mea- operation and not in the air operation. suring the degree of achieved air superiority by contrasting the balance between NATO air forces and - The second force, Force 3F-3S, adds an indepen- Pact air defense forces with that between Pact air dent air force element-the Vinnitsa strategic air forces and NATO air defense forces. Interest also has army-which requires considerable logistic support been expressed in more complex methods that would but not nearly as much as would be needed to move include a comparison of the capabilities of the oppos- up an entire front. We chose not to add a detached ing sides' integrated air and ground forces. This would front air force from a second-echelon front to this allow calculation of the effect of relative air superior- force because its use could result in sufficient ity on ground combat. We have no evidence that aircraft attrition to seriously impair the front's either of these more advanced methods has yet been fighting ability before its commitment to battle. implemented; we have therefore conned our calcula- this is probably tions to a simple homogeneous forces application. the Soviets' preference for committing reserve front air for,.cs to battle. It also is consistent with their military writings, which state that the main reason Counting Assumptions for disestablishing the numbered tactical air armies Our ability to confidently calculate air balances that in 1980 and 1981 was to fully integrate front fully reflect Soviet perceptions is constrained by our aviation into the joint forces fronts. We also did not incomplete understanding of how and which forces use Moscow strategic air army Bears or Bisons in would be counted and of Soviet estimates of the range of likely reinforcement scenarios. Our calculations of 69 Top Secret
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.