Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Mission Control”9 pages
Top"Secret reconnaissance sensor packages. The absence of nu- The Soviets normally plan to use most of their forces clear weapon storage facilities at their airbases, how- on the main axis of attack in any operation; we ever, may indicate that they have only a conventional estimate therefore that about 65 to.75 percent of the attack role (as is the case with front aviation recon- efforts of the Smolensk air army probably would be naissance regiments). Limited evidence spent in the Western TMO. This estimate is based on nd our estimate that the the assumption that the distribution of Smolensk air Soviets would have extensive requirements for strate- army efforts would be similar to the intended concen- gic reconnaissance during nuclear operations also tration of other Pact forces and the distribution of suggest that these two regiments probably do not have targets in each of the three TMOs. Evidence a nuclear strike role. We estimate that these two m indicates that about two-thirds of the ground regiments are each comprised of two reconnaissance forces and front air forces in the European theater of squadrons and one ECM support squadron, but that war probably would be used in the Western TMO, the majority of these aircraft can also be configured and our analysis of the distribution of strategic-depth for a secondary conventional bombing role-possibly targets concludes that about 75 percent are contained for long-range search-and-destroy missions against in that TMOJ high-value mobile targets and for delivery of photo- flash bombs to support night reconnaissance We arrive at generally similar conclusions if we assume that the efforts of the 24 strike regiments of the Smolensk, Legnica, and Vinnitsa air armies might The specialized electronic warfare regiment in the be collectively applied to the three TMOs in the same Smolensk air army probably is e uipped entirely with proportions as the front forces (about 5 percent to the Badger HJ support aircraft. all Northwestern TMO, 65 percent to the Western three squadrons of this regiment were equipped with TMO, and 30 percent to the Southwestern TMO). If Badger J's (except for a handful of Badger H's) in the the Legnica air army was assigned entirely to the late 1960s. and we know that this regiment used at Western TMO and the Vinnitsa air army was used least the equivalent of two squadrons of such aircraft only in the Southwestern TMO, to attain a 5-65-30 in support of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. overall distribution of effort the Smolensk air army The regiment's flight-training program has not in- would devote about 10 percent of its effort to the eluded live bombing since the mid-to-late 1960s, and Northwestern TMO, 80 percent to the Western the current limited and infrequent use of a bomb TMO, and 10 percent to the Southwestern TMO. For range could be accounted for by a requirement to the same distribution of effort among TMOs, if about maintain a minimum bombing proficiency for all one-third of the Vinnitsa air army's effort in the bomber pilots or by a secondary bombing role for the theater of war was instead used in the Westurn TMO, Badger H's. This electronic warfare regiment appears the Smolensk air army effort might be divided so that to have gained a fourth ECM squadron in 1982 as 10 percent went to the Northwestern TMO, 65 per- part of the redistribution of old aircraft from a Badger cent to the Western TMO, and 25 percent to the G strike regiment that had upgraded to Backfire. Southwestern TMO. We believe that the distribution of Smolensk air army efforts would favor the Western TMO more that would the division of front forces Participation in the Western TMO efforts, however, because of the relatively greater We have no direct evidence as to how the Soviets concentration of strategic-depth targets in the center intend to distribute the efforts of the Smolensk strate- of the theater of war and the comparatively greater gic air army between the three TMOs of the Europe- availability of SNA medium bombers to attack an theater of war. While the entire force of the air targets on the flanks.K army probably would frequently be concentrated in a single TMO for one massed air raid or for a series of massed raids, the Soviet General StaiT probably would divide the overall efforts of the air army for a period of two or more weeks among the three TMOs. 67 ToySecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.