Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“The Advance”13 pages
Top Secret Table 7 Estimated Composition and Roles of the Smolensk Strategic Air Army (mid-1983) Aircraft Total Strike/Attack Role Electronic Counter- Reconnaissance Tanker Type Available measures Role Role Role Primary Secondary Flyable Primary Flyable Primary Secondary Primary Storage Storage Backfire BC 60 60 - _ - 20* Blinder B 64 64 30- Blinder ACD 86 40 to 50 to 30 to 75b 55< 35' Badger G 169 140 to 25 to 70a 145' 30d Badger HJK 103 35 to 50 * loo r 3r Badger EF 3 3 Badger (TD) 8 8 --- Total (rounded) 495 265 to 75 to 25 to 150 to 5 35 to 120 10 270 125 30 155 40 We assume that one strike squadron in each strike regiment trains d Assumes Badger G's at main operating basesin excessof about 24 in a secondary reconnaissance role, aircraft per regiment are in flyable storage.bAssumes 10 to 20 reconnaissance aircraft and up to 25.jamming <Estimated number of Badger H aircraft, assuming four to six peraircraft cannot be reconfigured to carry bombs. Badger strike regiment and 10 to 15 in the ECM regiment. c Assumes one ECM support squadron for each of the fie Blinder rAssumes one ECM support squadron for each Badger strike regiments and two reconnaissance squadrons in each of the two regiment plus four such squadrons in the ECNI regiment. It is not reconnaissance regiments. clear whether any are in flyable storage. All of the Backfires that are operationally deployed in probably contains at least one squadron of dedicated the three (and part of a fourth) Backfirc strike reconnaissance aircraft. Recent analysis regiments of the Smolensk air army probably are has revealed that one of these two regiments strike aircraft capable of carrying bombs and ASMs. also has a full squadron of Blinders that have been No Backfire support variants have yet been identified modified with various configurations of blade anten- in service, and we have not observed training I nas (possibly for electronic intelligtace collection), and that would indicate the use of that at least one other aircraft has been modified to specialized support aircraft. We project that the carry a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) system. Soviets will probably elect to deploy some Backfire The flight-training programs of these two regiments, reconnaissance and dedicated jammer variants some however, include free-fall bombing and dedicated time in the future, though probably in considerably ECM and chaff-support missions, as well as intelli- fewer numbers than was the case with the Badger gence collection flights-implying a secondary ground program. attack role perhaps similar to that of front aviation reconnaissance regiments uggest Support Regiments. We are unable to determine the that the bomb bays of most of these aircraft probably composition of the two Blinder reconnaissance regi- can be readily reconfigured to carry either bombs or ments ecauscwe vee ientfihed1inider C e have estimated for many years t at each regiment 1 p..cn 66
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.