Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Cooper”4 pages
Top Secret - Performing operational reconnaissance in support of Tactical heliborne assault landings (normally to thethe front staff, ground forces missile and artillery depth of 25 to 70 km behind NATO lines with theforces, and the front air force to a depth of at least aid of front-level army aviation transport helicopter400 km using front air force reconnaissance regiments). aircraft. e Tactical air reconnaissance for the ground armyThe Soviets would also dedicate a substantial number staff and army missile and artillery forces (using theof their sorties to defense suppression and electronic army aviation force's helicopters and drones as wellwarfare, but they treat these roles as an integral part as allocated front reconnaissance aircraft sorties toof all other offensive air forces missions, rather than the depth of the army offensive operation-typicallyas separate missions. about 150 to 300 km behind NATO lines) Army Operations Army operations would be directed by the combined- arms and tank army commanders. The objectives of army oflensive operations usually would be stipulated by front commanders to include the defeat of the main forces of specific opposing NATO army corps and an advance to a particular line (typically 150 to 300 km deep in the first army operations minfive to seven days. Army commanders would have attheir disposal several subordinate motorized rifle and tank divisions, army missile and artillery forces,army air defense forces, an army aviation force, and various combat support components, as well as specif- ic temporary contributions from forces assigned di- rectly to their parent fronts The army aviation force of a combined-arms or tank army is a tactical-level air force formation, equipped primarily with helicopters, that is responsible for coordinating and controlling all organic and external air force support to the army operation. The primary air forces roles in direct support of army operations arc: * Air support-which includes all ground attack mis- sions in support of the army fire-support plan, using attack helicopters primarily against first-echelon NATO brigades, and concentrating the majority of front fighter-bomber sorties against the second- echelon targets in NATO's first-line divisions (al- though both types of aircraft would perform close air support and battlefield interdiction missions). 63 To srat
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.