Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Tol Secret Appendix A The Joint Forces Command Structure and the Roles of Air Forces in Front and Army Operations The Joint Forces Command System the strategic force grouping in the TMO to which Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine (which are identical) they are assigned. These directives would typically stipulate that all wartime operations are to be planned specify the defeat of the main forces of opposing and directed by a hierarchical system of joint forces NATO army groups and an advance to a particular commands. At the apex of this command pyramid is line (typically 250 to 600 kilometers deep in the firstthe Soviet Supreme High Command (the leadership front operations) in 10 to 15 days. Subsequent front body that would command all Soviet and Pact armed offensive operations into France could have a depth offorces on behalf of the Soviet national command 700 to 800 kin. The front commanders would have atauthority) and its executive agent, the Soviet General their disposal several subordinate ground armies, Staff. Soviet control of the key Pact command posi- front missile and artillery forces, front air defensetions is intended to ensure that the multinational joint forces, a front air force, and various combat supportforces commands would operate uniformly in war in components, as well as specific temporary contribu- accordance with the military objectives and the force tions from strategic forces from the high command toemployment concepts specilled by the Soviet General which they are assigned. Staff. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) coun- tries would provide forces and staffs for the armies A front air force is an operational-level air forceand fronts but would not be actively involved in formation, equipped predominantly with fighter-type strategic planning aircraft, which is responsible for planning and direct- ing air forces support of the front operation. TheThe Soviet and NSWP air forces, like the other primary air forces roles in direct support of front armed services, are merely responsible for providing objectives are: combat-ready forces and staff elements to serve as integra! :.,,,irnts of the wartime joint forces com- + Providing air cover of the front's forces and its rear mands. Their doctrine states that, rather than operat- area installations by contributing and directing ing inepcndently, air forces are to be used by the front air force fighter-interceptors in accordance joint foc,:s commanders in a manner complementary with the front air defense plan, to the actions of the other forces in accordance with a single concept of operations. In general, Pact air Conducting offensive counterair missions to achieve forces formations are tailored to meet the needs of and maintain air supremacy in the sector of frontjoint forces operations conducted at three levels of operations by performing front air force fighter command-strategic, front, and army (figure 17 de- sweeps and fighter-bomber attacks against NATOpicts the place of Soviet air forces formations in the airfields. hierarchical joint forces command structure). Strate- gic operations arc discussed in the first section of this. Locating and destroying NATO SSMs and nuclear paper weapons in the front sector of operations using front air force fighter-bombers as well as some allocated Front Operations strategic aviation bomber sorties. Warsaw Pact front operations would be directed by the joint forces front commanders according to objec- Preventing NATO reinforcement by the reserve tives stipulated by the commander in chief (CinC) of forces of the opposing army groups by attacking second-echelon NATO divisions, army corps, and their means of transportation with front air force fighter-bombers and some allocated strategic avia- tion bomber sorties. 61To
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.