Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“Headquarters”10 pages
Top Secret Future Soviet Initiatives. We believe the Soviets probably are giving high priority to new long-term initiatives aimed at improving their prospects for winning air supremacy in Central Europe. We base this conclusion on the great importance that the Soviets place on achieving this objective and on our judgment that the Soviets probably are not content with the less desirable alternatives to the theaterwide air operation that they recentlyhave developed as a matter of necessity. The Soviets' intentions are not clear, but some of the initiatives that they might pursue could alter the character of their air supremacy campaign: - The Soviets may hope that extensive force modernization with the new SU-27 and MIG-29 fighters will improve the air balance by the mid- 19 9 0s enough to justify a return to the theaterwide air operation as their best option at the outset of war. -- - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced fighters also could, in conjunction with improved NATO airfield hardening and intelligence warning capabilities, lead the Soviets to rely more heavily on air-to-air combat to destroy NATO air forces in the air operation. - The widespread use of terminal guidance on Soviet short-range ballistic missiles by the early-to-middle 1990s could give these conventionally armed missiles a major airfield pin-down role in the air operation as a prelude to the bomber attacks. This could help the Pact achieve tactical surprise and make NATO airfields more lucrative targets. - The Soviets may eventually develop special air defense suppression drones and eflicient air-delivered airfield attack munitions, which could allow them to execute the air operation using considerably fewer aircraft and less rigid and predictable employment concepts. iup,S~crct vi
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.