Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
“The Advance”13 pages
Top Secret - The deployment of large numbers of these advanced Introduce jam-resistant communications that could fighters also could, in conjunction with continued be essential to the success of operations that involve improvement in NATO airfield hardening and intel- retasking airborne strike aircraft, vectoring fighter ligence warning capabilities, lead the Soviets to rely sweep groups from AWACS aircraft, and retarget- on air-to-air combat to destroy a much larger share ing SSMs on the basis of radio-relayed visual of NATO's aircraft in the air operation. This reconnaissance. approach, however, would also require major im- provements in Soviet fighter pilot training for con- - Introduce improved reconnaissance and target- ducting autonomous offensive aerial engagements, acquisition sensors for fighter-bombers and light bombers in response to the nagging shortcomings in - The expected widespread deployment of terminal the capability of Pact air forces to perform the high- guidance on Soviet short-range ballistic missiles and priority task of locating and destroying NATO's the continued expansion of that force could, by the mobile SSMs. early-to-middle 1990s, allow the Soviets to assign a major airfield pin-down role in the air operation to - Develop more advanced designs of such traditional conventionally armed ballistic missiles as a prelude penetration aids as onboard electronic countermeas- to the bomber attacks. This could substantially ures gear and antiradar missiles to help minimize improve the Pact's prospects for achieving tactical aircraft losses. surprise and make NATO airfields more lucrative targets. Expand their airfield network and war reserve stocks to facilitate rapid reinforcement by substan- - The Soviets eventually may develop special air tial numbers of strategic aviation light bombers and defense suppression drones and efficient air-deliv- possibly some medium bombers. cred airfield attack munitions, which could allow them to exec;'te the air operation using considerably - Replace some of their older, deeper based medium fewer aircraft in each massed air raid and improve bombers with forward-based let bombers to their prospects for limiting their aircraft losses to achieve shorter reaction times and higher sortie acceptably low levels. Smaller attack forces also rates. could ease the strains on their command and control system, and in turn might increase the likelihood Conduct more frequent joint forces field training that the Soviets would adopt less rigid and predict- exercises, esrcially exercises that emphasize the able employment concepts precise execution of closely timed events and the ad hoc retasking of forces The roles that the Soviet General Staff intends the Pact air forces to perform in direct support of the strategic operations of the Western high command emphasize concentration of force, are particularly complex., and require extensive and timely coordina- tion with many other forces. We therefore believe the Soviets may be impelled to take further initiatives to: . Better integrate the air forces into the joint forces commands. - Field more high-capacity interactive automated data systems to aid commanders and their battle staffs. 59 Toii.Secr
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.