Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

To Secret
aircraft. These bombers have crews trained to per- would be limited for the most part to simply confirm-
form visual reconnaissance and can be fitted with a ing the locations of known targets.
rudimentary photographic capability.
The reconnaissance aircraft of the Legnica strategic Observations
air army would also be available to the Western high
command, but they are operational reconnaissance We have a good understanding of Soviet doctrine and
aircraft. most of whose targets would probably fall many of the force employment concepts that would
within the area also covered by the front air forces. form the basis for how the Warsaw Pact air forces
The results of front air forces and strategic aviation would be used at the beginning of a war in Central
operational reconnaissance missions would be made Europe. We cannot, of course, say exactly how Pact
available to strategic planners, however, through sum- air forces would be used throughout the course of a
mary reports, war because the Soviets undoubtedly would modify
their priorities and force employment concepts to
E.recuzion. It is not clear to what extent the Western some extent during a protracted war. If Soviet think-
high command would be permitted to task strategic ing about air forces support of theater-level objectives
reconnaissance aircraft, because they would normally continues to evolve according to current trends, how-
be held as part of the Soviet national strategic reserve ever, we can predict many of the changes that the
forces. On the basis of our understanding of Soviet Soviets are likely to consider making to their air
front reconnaissance tasking, we estimate that blocks forces up to the mid-1990s.
of sorties from the Smolensk strategic air army
reconnaissance regiments probably would be provided We believe the Soviets probably are giving high
to the Western .ielh.oinmnaeLhvheCr cris priority to new long-term initiatives aimed at improv-
ing the Warsaw Pact's prospects for winning strategic
air supremacy in the Western TMO. We base this
conclusion on authoritative Soviet statements that
winning air supremacy would be the first priority of
the Pact joint forces at the outset of war in support of
Potential Problens. During the final reconnaissance their conventional strategic offensive in the Western
for the initial massed nuclear strike, insufficient TMO, This conclusion is also based on our judgment
tanker support could force many Smolensk strategic that the Soviet General StafT probably is not content
air army Blinders to conduct their missions against with the less desirable alternatives to the theaterwide
the deepest targets in the Wcstcrn TMO at high air operation that they recently have developed as a
altitudes, which might result in high rates of attrition. matter of necessity. The Soviets' intentions are not
Soviet aircrews have also encountered difficulties clear, but some of the initiatives that they might
locating mobile target, which could limit pursue could substantially alter the character of their
their effectiveness in monitoring the movements of air supremacy campaign:
NATO reserves and mobile SSMs.Z
- The Soviets may have committed themselves to an
The capability to conduct strategic reconnaissance extensive modernization program to replace their
with Blinder aircraft is limited by their inability to fighter forces opposite NATO with the more ad-
relay photographic and electronic intelligence data to vanced SU-27 and MIG-29, in the hope that by theground processing centers. Instead, the aircraft must mid-1990s sufficient qualitative gains could be
return to their bases before the information can be made in the air balance to justify a return to the
processed, dela ingexploitation of the resits, by theaterwide air operation as their best option at thehours in time- outset of war. To succeed, the Pact would have to
urgen -ii csTemrcr-rmt-woro-iave to resort to introduce their new aircraft into the force at a
transmitting less accurate visual air reconnaissance substantially faster rate than the rate of moderniza-
results by jammable radio communications. Because tion in NATO.
imagery would be required to perform accurate initial
targeting for SSMs, vi:;ual reconnaissance probably
Tu;-S wret 58